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CONSTITUTIONAL EVASION AND THE 
CONFRONTATION PUZZLE 
DAVID L. NOLL* 
Abstract: One of the most notable developments in contemporary constitution-
al law is the breakdown of jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in 
Crawford v. Washington. There, the Court promised doctrine that faithfully ap-
plied the Clause’s original meaning, was simple to administer, and protected 
criminal defendants against convictions secured through suspect evidence. Post-
Crawford case law has not delivered on these promises. This Article argues that 
Crawford’s failure reflects an unsuccessful attempt to regulate evasion of the 
Confrontation Clause. Though justified by the Court on originalist grounds, the 
rule of Crawford, holding that “testimonial” evidence triggers a right to confront 
the responsible “witness,” is best understood as an attempt to regulate govern-
mental evasion of the basic Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses who 
give live testimony in legal proceedings. The need for doctrine that performs 
this function results from the transformation in evidence between the framing 
and present day. The Crawford Court, however, did not acknowledge the need 
to regulate evasion of the basic confrontation right, nor did it grapple with im-
portant policy questions a legal policymaker regulating evasion of the law must 
address. This account: (1) suggests a reorientation of confrontation doctrine that 
would permit the Court to overcome the uncertainty that plagues post-Crawford 
jurisprudence; (2) suggests a decision tree for courts considering whether and 
how to regulate seemingly evasive activities; and (3) contributes new data to the 
long-running debate between “pragmatist” and “doctrinalist” scholars over the 
utility of identifying a separate category of doctrine that implements constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, David L. Noll. All rights reserved. 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. Thanks to participants at Loyola Universi-
ty-Chicago’s Fifth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium, a Rutgers Faculty Colloquium, and a 
Rutgers Junior Faculty Workshop for engaging discussion and criticism; to Bernard Bell, Jessica 
A. Clarke, Joe Doll, Bethany Davis Noll, Brannon P. Denning, George Fisher, Michael B. Kent, 
Jr., John Leubsdorf, Anthony O’Rourke, George C. Thomas III, Sabrina Safrin, and Don Rehkopf, 
Jr. for written comments on prior drafts; to Martin Kurzweil and James Nelson for help framing 
the project at its earliest stages; and to Don Ayer, Sam Estreicher, and Meir Feder for introducing 
me to the problems of contemporary Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Lee Sims, Stephanie 
Lopez, Nick Rodriguez, and Joshua Smith provided invaluable research assistance. I gratefully 
acknowledge financial support of the William S. Powers Research Fund. A note on the text: when 
quoting sixteenth and seventeenth century sources, I have followed the convention of modernizing 
spelling and punctuation without indication in the text. Cf. John H. Langbein, The Historical 
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 
n.* (1996). Titles of historical sources are reproduced in their original form. 
1900 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1899 
tional norms as opposed to elaborating the Constitution’s textual and historical 
meaning. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, caselaw applying a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”1 has 
ceased generating theoretically defensible results. Consider the prosecutions 
of Kendrick Proctor, Rae Carruth, and Sandy Williams. 
On August 4, 2001, Rodriguez “Yogi” Proctor called 911 to report that 
his brother Kendrick was high and firing a gun into the ground.2 Yogi un-
derstood the criminal justice system well enough to know that the call 
would be recorded and used as evidence; he said that Kendrick had “been in 
the penitentiary so he ain’t supposed to possess no gun,” and that “y’all [the 
police] know him real good.”3 Yogi also had a motive to lie. He had a prior 
felony conviction4 and the gun Kendrick was shooting had been taken from 
the front dashboard of Yogi’s car.5 
When Kendrick was tried on firearms charges, the trial judge referred 
to Yogi as the “chief prosecuting witness”6 but nonetheless permitted the 
prosecution to offer a transcript of his 911 call without calling Yogi as a 
witness. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 It 
rejected Kendrick’s argument that the prosecution’s use of the call violated 
Kendrick’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.9 
On the evening of November 15, 1999, NFL wide-receiver Rae Car-
ruth participated in the murder of his pregnant girlfriend Cherica Adams.10 
As Adams was driving behind Carruth, Carruth slowed his SUV to a stop, 
forcing Adams to slow down to avoid hitting him.11 A car driven by Car-
ruth’s friend pulled alongside Adams, and a passenger in the car fired five 
shots at Adams.12 Adams called 911, was taken to the hospital, slipped into 
a coma, and later died.13 At Carruth’s trial, the State introduced statements 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2 United States v. Proctor, 505 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 3 Id. at 368–69. 
 4 Brief of Appellee at 8, Proctor, 505 F.3d 366 (No. 07-60011). 
 5 Proctor, 505 F.3d at 368. 
 6 Brief for Appellant at 13, Proctor, 505 F.3d 366 (No. 07-60011). 
 7 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the introduction of “testimonial” evidence triggers a right 
to confront the responsible “witness”). 
 8 Proctor, 505 F.3d at 368. 
 9 Id. at 372. 
 10 See Wiggins v. Boyette, 635 F.3d 116, 118–19 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
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that Adams made to a police officer and nurse at the hospital, in which she 
explained how she was shot.14 
In a collateral challenge to Carruth’s conviction, the North Carolina 
courts concluded that the State violated Carruth’s confrontation rights by 
introducing Adams’s post-shooting statements.15 Applying Crawford, the 
North Carolina courts reasoned that Adams was a “witness” who Carruth 
was entitled to cross-examine before her statements could be admitted.16 
That Carruth arranged Adams’s murder—eliminating any possibility that 
she could be called as a witness—did not enter the court’s analysis.17 
In 2006, the State of Illinois tried Sandy Williams for rape.18 To estab-
lish that Williams committed the rape, the State called an analyst who 
worked in its forensic laboratory system.19 The analyst testified that a DNA 
profile derived from semen in the rape kit collected from the victim follow-
ing the rape matched a DNA profile derived a sample of from Williams’s 
blood.20 The forensic analysts who derived the DNA profile from the rape 
kit did not appear as trial witnesses.21 The justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court set out four different approaches to determining whether the testify-
ing analyst’s testimony violated Williams’s confrontation rights,22 none of 
which attracted the support of a majority.23 The Court appears to be at a loss 
about how to proceed. In May 2014, it denied a dozen petitions for certiora-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Id. at 119. 
 15 State v. Wiggins, No. 99 CRS 46567, 2005 WL 857109, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 
2005). The error ultimately was found harmless because other evidence overwhelmingly estab-
lished Carruth’s guilt. Id. at *1, *4; see Wiggins, 635 F.3d at 128–29. 
 16 See Wiggins, 2005 WL 857109, at *2. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 19 See id. 
 20 Id. at 2230–31. More precisely, the analyst Sandra Lambatos testified as follows:  
[B]ased on her own comparison of the two DNA profiles, she “concluded that [peti-
tioner] cannot be excluded as a possible source of the semen identified in the vaginal 
swabs,” and that the probability of the profile’s appearing in the general population 
was “1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390 quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion 
Hispanic unrelated individuals.” Asked whether she would “call this a match to [pe-
titioner],” Lambatos answered yes . . . over defense counsel’s objection. 
Id. at 2229 (alterations in original) (recounting the analyst’s trial testimony). 
 21 Id. at 2231. 
 22 Compare id. at 2240 (concluding that a defendant is not entitled to confront analysts if the 
testifying expert personally vouches for forensic conclusions), with id. at 2244 (concluding that a 
defendant is not entitled to confront analysts if analysts lack the “primary purpose” of generating 
criminal evidence), and id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that a defendant is not 
entitled to confront analysts if their conclusions are reported in an “informal” document), and id. 
at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (concluding that a defendant is generally entitled to confront ana-
lysts). 
 23 Id. at 2227 (plurality opinion). 
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ri imploring it to clarify standards for the admissibility of forensic reports 
under Williams.24 
All of these cases applied an understanding of the Confrontation 
Clause set out in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford.25 The 
first of two originalist interventions at the turn of the twenty-first century,26 
Crawford held that if criminal evidence contains a “testimonial” statement, 
the person responsible for the statement must testify at trial unless that per-
son is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”27 The Court reasoned that this “testimonial” rule 
captured the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment and protected the 
interests of courts and criminal defendants. Doctrine organized around the 
testimonial concept, the Court promised, would faithfully apply the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, be simple for courts to administer, and 
protect criminal defendants against the use of suspect evidence.28 
In practice, Crawford delivered what Justice Antonin Scalia, the author 
of the Crawford opinion, now describes as a “shambles.”29 A decade after 
Crawford, irreconcilable divisions among the justices and abiding uncertainty 
over the forms of evidence that trigger the confrontation right characterize 
confrontation doctrine. The leading academic proponent of Crawford sug-
gests it may take decades for doctrine to reach a stable equilibrium.30 Others 
describe post-Crawford jurisprudence as a “debacle,”31 “train wreck,”32 and 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Arauz v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014) (mem.) (denying petition for certiorari); 
Brewington v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.) (same); Edwards v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (mem.) (same); Galloway v. Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (mem.) 
(same); James v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.) (same); Marshall v. Colorado, 134 
S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (mem.) (same); Maxwell v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.) 
(same); Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.) (same); Turner v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.) (same); Walker v. Wisconsin, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) 
(mem.) (same); Williams v. Massachusetts, 134 S. Ct. 2672 (2014) (mem.) (same); Yohe v. Penn-
sylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (mem.) (same). 
 25 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 26 See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to possess and use a firearm for lawful purposes including 
self-defense in an individual’s residence). 
 27 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. The only exceptions to this rule were those “established at 
the time of the founding,” such as for dying declarations. Id. at 54. 
 28 See, e.g., id. at 60 (accepting the suggestion that the Court revise its doctrine “to reflect 
more accurately the original understanding of the [Confrontation] Clause”); id. at 67 (expressing 
desire to not “leave too much discretion in judicial hands”). 
 29 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 380 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 30 See Richard D. Friedman, Who Said the Crawford Revolution Would Be Easy?, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. 14, 19 (2012) (“The confrontation right has been around for centuries, and will be for centu-
ries to come. If it takes a while longer to get it right, so be it.”). 
 31 George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 26 
(2014), http://michiganlawreview.org/the-crawford-debacle/ [http://perma.cc/2GA2-L4NU] 
(“[T]he Crawford framework’s greatest failing is its stubborn refusal to make sense.”). 
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“mess.”33 At the trial-court level, the scope of the Confrontation Clause turns 
on formalistic distinctions that lack any apparent basis in the Sixth Amend-
ment or an established theory of evidence. For example, whether a report of 
forensic testing can be admitted without giving the accused an opportunity to 
confront the report’s author turns on the “formality” and “solemnity” of the 
document in which the report is memorialized.34 A notarized affidavit triggers 
a right of confrontation,35 whereas a letter lacking indicia of formality does 
not,36 even if the two documents set forth the exact same information. 
To be sure, this jurisprudential shambles benefits some defendants by 
giving them additional leverage in plea bargaining.37 But it falls short as 
regulation. Because the admissibility of evidence under Crawford lacks an 
obvious basis in the Sixth Amendment or an established theory of evidence, 
confrontation doctrine benefits defendants in a scattershot way. Meanwhile, 
intuitively problematic forms of evidence—such as Yogi Proctor’s 911 
call—are admitted without affording the accused an opportunity for con-
frontation. 
This Article aims to explain the failure of contemporary Confrontation 
Clause doctrine. It contends—in contrast to accounts that focus on the 
Court’s historiography, broader embrace of originalism, and fidelity to 
Crawford’s principles in post-Crawford cases38—that the answer lies in the 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Kevin C. McMunigal, Crawford, Confrontation, and Mental States, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
219, 220 (2014) (observing that commentators have described contemporary Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence as “‘incoherent,’ ‘uncertain,’ ‘unpredictable,’ ‘a train wreck,’ suffering from 
‘vagueness’ and ‘double-speak,’ and, simply put, a ‘mess.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 33 Id.; see also Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation 
Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (2011) (stating that contemporary Confrontation Clause doc-
trine is “highly subjective, fact-intensive, [and] malleable”); David Crump, Overruling Crawford 
v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 132 (2012) (calling post-Crawford 
doctrine “unworkable”); Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness 
Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 780 (2014) (describing “other major hazards in the post-
Crawford minefield”). But see Dylan O. Keenan, Note, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in 
the Lower Courts, 122 YALE L.J. 782 (2012) (arguing, based on a logistic regression analysis of 
lower court decisions, that lower courts “have made sense of Crawford”). 
 34 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 35 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329–30 (2009) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
 36 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 37 See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shad-
ow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2458 (2004). 
 38 See, e.g., Crump, supra note 33, at 127 (pointing out “erroneous reasoning” in Crawford); 
Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay 
Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2007) (arguing that Crawford does not reflect 
the framers’ understanding and that originalism generally is a flawed approach to constitutional 
interpretation); Michael R. Noveck, Recent Development: The Death of Confrontation Clause 
Originalism?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 251, 253 (2012) (arguing that the Court’s failure to 
embrace a broader forfeiture rule required it to abandon Crawford’s originalist premises); Ben 
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nature of the rule Crawford laid down. Though Crawford justified the tes-
timonial rule on originalist grounds, that rule is best understood as an at-
tempt to regulate governmental evasion of the basic right to be confronted 
with witnesses who present live testimony. The Crawford regime’s failure 
results from the fact that the Court did not acknowledge that the task for 
doctrine was to regulate evasion. Further, the Court ignored important ques-
tions a policymaker regulating evasion of a legal norm must address. These 
missteps triggered the failure of contemporary Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence. 
The argument proceeds in two steps. The initial move is to recognize a 
point virtually absent from the voluminous literature on the post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause: the Clause’s text and historical meaning do not com-
pel Crawford’s “testimonial” rule.39 Insofar as criminal prosecutions were 
concerned, “evidence” at the framing consisted largely of witness testimo-
ny, which was sometimes taken in pre-trial proceedings where the accused 
was not afforded a right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”40 Indeed, colonial trial minutes do not distinguish between witness 
testimony and other forms of evidence, describing witnesses simply as “Ev-
idences” for the prosecution or the defense.41 “Evidence” did not include 
most out-of-court statements—including the kind of statements contained in 
911 calls, reports of criminal investigations, and reports of forensic testing. 
To framing-era lawyers, such statements would have constituted “no evi-
dence” at all.42 They were not legal proof of guilt or innocence.  
Because of this, historical understandings of the Confrontation Clause 
do not answer when, if ever, statements by an individual who is not a wit-
ness in a legal proceeding trigger a right of confrontation. Those who enact-
ed the Sixth Amendment would have understood a criminal defendant’s 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”43 to apply to persons 
                                                                                                                           
Trachtenberg, Testimonial Is as Testimonial Does, 66 FLA. L. REV. 467, 468 (2014) (questioning 
historical accuracy of Crawford’s understanding of the Confrontation Clause). 
 39 For prior suggestions to this effect, see Davies, supra note 38, at 351–52; Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s Irrele-
vance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 472 (2007). See also Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 70–71 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see infra notes 229–252 and accompanying text (discussing pre-
trial proceedings during the framing era). 
 41 See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL 
NEW YORK 629 n.81 (1970); George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The 
Royal Colony of New Jersey 1749–57, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 675 (2005) (providing ex-
ample of colonial trial minutes from 1752 describing witnesses as “Evidences for the Crown” and 
“Evidences for the defendant”). 
 42 2 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 889 (Capel Lofft ed., 1791); see infra note 
218 and accompanying text.  
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
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who appear in a legal proceeding and offer live testimony. They would not 
have understood the Confrontation Clause to say what evidence is, or the 
conditions under which evidence not created by an ordinary witness could 
be admitted. The rule of Crawford untethers the Clause from witnesses and 
sets up the Clause as a general source of regulation for all evidence. From a 
historical perspective, this move is dubious. 
The second step in the Article’s argument involves the justification for 
Crawford’s untethering of the Confrontation Clause from its original mean-
ing. Though the historical meaning of the Clause does not compel Craw-
ford’s testimonial rule, that rule can be justified as an effort to regulate eva-
sion of the accused’s confrontation right made possible by the sea change in 
the understanding of evidence between the framing and the present day. 
Under the framing-era understanding of evidence, the accused’s right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him” provided a relatively complete 
guarantee of the quality of criminal evidence. Evidence generally consisted 
of witness testimony, and a right of confrontation ensured such testimony’s 
fairness and completeness. Under the modern understanding of evidence, 
the protection provided by a right to confront witnesses is far weaker. Be-
cause the law today understands evidence to include many sources of in-
formation besides witness testimony,44 the prosecution can easily use non-
witness evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt.45 When it does so, the 
government may appear to be evading the confrontation right. 
Crawford’s testimonial rule bridges the gap created by the transfor-
mation in the understanding of evidence between the framing era and the 
present day. By subjecting all “testimonial” evidence to the Confrontation 
Clause regardless of whether it was generated by a witness in the ordinary 
sense of the term, Crawford addresses the government’s ability to evade the 
Confrontation Clause by using forms of evidence that serve the same func-
tion as witness testimony but are not subject to the basic confrontation 
right.46 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (defining relevant evidence as any evidence with a “tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). See generally JEFFER-
SON L. INGRAM, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2011) (outlining forms of evidence used in modern crimi-
nal prosecutions). 
 45 Bentham observed that “merely with a view to rectitude of decision . . . no species of evi-
dence whatsoever . . . ought to be excluded.” 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVI-
DENCE 1 (1827). 
 46 For a prior suggestion to this effect, see Fisher, supra note 31, at 26 (observing that “the 
declarant’s or interrogator’s intent to create trial evidence while evading cross-examination” is a 
“common component” of statements subject to the Confrontation Clause in the Court’s post-
Crawford caselaw). In describing Crawford as an “anti-evasion” rule, I do not mean to imply that 
the prosecution acts in bad faith when it makes use of statements by a speaker that the accused has 
not confronted, or that the prosecution specifically intends to strip the accused of the right to con-
front the witnesses against him or her. As explained below, legal systems label different kinds of 
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But if the testimonial rule is best understood as an effort to regulate 
governmental evasion of the confrontation right, it is not a successful one. 
The Crawford Court did not acknowledge that it was undertaking to regu-
late evasion of the basic confrontation right, appreciate the differences 
among forms of evasion that a legal system can regulate, or recognize the 
costs and benefits of regulatory strategies that different forms of evasion 
entail.47 Indeed, Crawford suggested that courts could understand which 
activities should be considered evasive simply by understanding the Con-
frontation Clause’s text. These missteps led to the doctrinal breakdown that 
continues to this day. When the Court encountered evidence that did not 
intuitively involve evasion of the confrontation right, it splintered. 
This account of the breakdown of contemporary Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence has wide-ranging implications. Most immediately, an accurate 
understanding of the Crawford experience suggests a reorientation of mod-
ern Confrontation Clause doctrine that would permit the Court to overcome 
the divisions and theoretical uncertainty that plague post-Crawford juris-
prudence. The Crawford experience also teaches that to succeed at an op-
erational level, judge-made doctrine that regulates evasion of constitutional 
norms must answer a predictable set of questions about the doctrine’s basis 
and scope.48 Unpacking those questions yields a decision tree or structured 
set of choices for courts asked to regulate activities that seem to involve 
evasion of a constitutional norm.49 
Understanding that decision tree in turn sheds light on a long-running 
debate in constitutional theory between pragmatist scholars, who contend 
that constitutional decisions invariably reflect an ad hoc patchwork of inter-
pretative, institutional, and remedial concerns,50 and “new doctrinalists,”51 
                                                                                                                           
activity “evasive,” only some of which require that a regulated actor act in bad faith or with con-
scious intent to avoid the law. See infra notes 395–398 and accompanying text (describing differ-
ent understandings of evasion); see also Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 611, 618–19 (2011) (considering reasons why conduct might be deemed evasive 
and exploring their relationship to a regulated actor’s state of mind). 
 47 See infra notes 395–405 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 458–479 and accompanying text.  
 49 See DAVID C. SKINNER, INTRODUCTION TO DECISION ANALYSIS 20 (2009); see also infra 
notes 458–479 and accompanying text. 
 50 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36–41 (2010) (explaining mech-
anisms through which constitutional understandings evolve); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism 
and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1987) (arguing that “solving legal problems 
using every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy,” 
is central to constitutional governance); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitu-
tional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 177 (2006) (ob-
jecting to the contention that a gap exists between “pure” constitutional meaning and implement-
ing doctrine); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 873 (1999) (arguing that “remedial equilibration,” or the tailoring of rights to remedial 
considerations, is an inescapable feature of constitutional adjudication). 
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who maintain that it is useful and theoretically coherent to approach doc-
trine that implements the Constitution as a distinct form of constitutional 
reasoning.52 The Crawford experience teaches that doctrine that responds to 
the evasion of constitutional norms problem is conceptually distinct from 
doctrine that elaborates the Constitution’s textual and historical meaning, 
and that, at least within this context, recognizing the distinction may be in-
dispensable to the development of workable doctrine. 
Part I briefly summarizes how post-Crawford case law has failed to de-
liver on the decision’s promises of fidelity to the Constitution and clear, eas-
ily administrable doctrine.53 Part II provides historical context by describing 
how those who adopted the Confrontation Clause would have understood its 
reference to “witnesses.”54 Part III sets out the Article’s central argument—
that Crawford’s sub rosa recognition of a rule that regulates evasion of the 
Confrontation Clause precipitated the failure of contemporary confrontation 
doctrine.55 Part IV describes some implications of this account.56 
I. THE CONFRONTATION PUZZLE 
What makes Crawford a puzzle for constitutional law is the gulf be-
tween the decision’s ambitions and the jurisprudential regime it established. 
Crawford offered a detailed account of the Confrontation Clause’s origins 
and announced a new interpretation of the Clause that was superficially 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 790 (2008) (suggesting the “New Doctrinalism” 
label). 
 52 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (cataloging 
ways that constitutional doctrine implements constitutional norms as opposed to elaborating their 
textual and historic meaning); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (proposing that many of the Supreme Court’s most important consti-
tutional decisions are best seen as a “constitutional common law” that is not strictly required by 
the Constitution’s textual and historical meaning); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1978) (positing 
that constitutional norms have “conceptual limits” distinct from those recognized in court deci-
sions and that “the contours of federal judicial doctrine regarding these norms . . . mark only the 
boundaries of the federal courts’ role of enforcement”). For scholarship specifically addressing the 
regulation of evasion of constitutional norms, see generally Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. 
Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (2014) (consider-
ing reasons why the Court fails to sanction evasion of constitutional norms), Brannon P. Denning 
& Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1773 
(2012) [hereinafter Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines] (identifying and describing anti-
evasion doctrines in constitutional law), Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1499 (2009) (describing various examples of types of “constitutional workarounds”), and 
infra note 457 (further describing this literature). 
 53 See infra notes 57–163 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 164–344 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 345–447 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 448–537 and accompanying text. 
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consistent with its text and the regulation of evidence at common law.57 
That interpretation, Crawford promised, would be simple for courts to ad-
minister and protect against prosecutions based on suspect evidence.58 A 
supermajority of justices supported the decision; only Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor objected to Crawford’s rein-
terpretation of the Confrontation Clause.59 
This Part offers a fuller picture of the Court’s failure to deliver on 
Crawford’s promises. Section A provides a short history of the Court’s 
treatment of the Confrontation Clause prior to Crawford.60 Section B then 
describes the Court’s central holdings in the Crawford case.61 Section C de-
tails the Court’s inability to elaborate workable Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence in the decade since Crawford was decided.62 
A. The Road to Crawford 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy” five enumerated rights, including “the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”63 A handful of Supreme Court 
decisions from the nineteenth century and early twentieth century applied 
the Confrontation Clause in federal criminal appeals.64 But it was not until 
the Sixth Amendment’s 1965 incorporation65 that the Court began to grap-
ple with the Clause’s meaning in earnest. 
The first landmark in the Court’s modern jurisprudence was the 1980 
decision in Ohio v. Roberts.66 The Court opined there that the central chal-
lenge for Confrontation Clause doctrine was to reconcile the accused’s right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him with the liberal use of hear-
say (out-of-court statements) permitted by the modern law of evidence.67 
Speaking through Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court stated that a literal read-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–53. 
 58 See id. at 66–68. 
 59 See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 60 See infra notes 63–81 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 82–112 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 113–163 and accompanying text. 
 63 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 64 See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 
282 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 259–60 (1895). See generally CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ET AL., 30A FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6356 (2013) [hereinafter WRIGHT & 
GRAHAM] (describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause from the 
time of the Civil War to the present). 
 65 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (extending the confrontation right to 
state proceedings). 
 66 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 67 Id. at 63. 
2015] Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle 1909 
ing of the Confrontation Clause “would abrogate virtually every hearsay ex-
ception.”68 This result, however, was “unintended” and “too extreme.”69 
According to Roberts, the Confrontation Clause instead established a 
super-structure that regulated the forms of evidence used in criminal trials 
and prohibited the use of particularly unreliable hearsay.70 The confronta-
tion right reflected a “preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,”71 
which in turn generated a “rule of necessity[:] . . . the prosecution must ei-
ther produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose 
statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”72 In the face of prosecuto-
rial complaints,73 the Court soon abandoned the unavailability require-
ment.74 Once it did so, the prosecution’s use of hearsay was consistent with 
the Confrontation Clause if adequate “indicia of reliability” ensured the 
hearsay’s accuracy.75 Statements covered by a “firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion” were presumptively reliable.76 Otherwise, the prosecution could intro-
duce hearsay statements only if it showed “particularized guarantees” of the 
statements’ accuracy.77 
In practice, Roberts tended to equate the Confrontation Clause with 
non-constitutional hearsay law.78 The “dominant theme” under Roberts 
“was that essentially all hearsay that satisfied traditional (‘firmly rooted’) 
exceptions had a free pass” from Sixth Amendment scrutiny79—and even 
recent exceptions were deemed “firmly rooted.”80 As one scholar has ob-
served, “there was something profoundly unsatisfactory about looking at 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 65–68. 
 71 Id. at 63. 
 72 Id. at 65.  
 73 See Brief for the United States at 35–37, United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (No. 
84-1580), 1985 WL 669910, at *10 (arguing that admission of statements in conformity with the 
traditional co-conspirator rule does not violate the Confrontation Clause, and that Clause does not 
proscribe or regulate the admission of hearsay). 
 74 See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. 
 75 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 6367 (discussing admissibility of different 
forms of hearsay under Roberts). 
 79 Christopher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When Is It Enough to Satisfy 
Crawford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007); see also Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. 
Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 575 (2004) (describing the Court’s treatment of 
the relationship between hearsay and the right to confrontation). 
 80 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (holding the exception for 
co-conspirator statements was firmly rooted); United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 
1989) (holding the exception for declarations against penal interest was firmly rooted); Lenza v. 
Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding the exception for statements reflecting declar-
ant’s “state of mind” was firmly rooted). 
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hearsay doctrine as imposing one set of reliability criteria and the Confron-
tation Clause as imposing substantially the same standard, only different.”81 
B. “A Successful Blend of Originalism and Formalism”82 
Crawford rejected the Roberts framework root and branch. In Craw-
ford, a police officer interrogated Sylvia Crawford shortly after her husband 
Michael stabbed Kenneth Lee, who had tried to rape Sylvia several weeks 
earlier.83 Sylvia’s statements to the police officer were inconsistent with 
Michael’s claim that he stabbed Lee in self-defense.84 At trial, Michael re-
fused to waive Washington’s spousal privilege, which prevented Sylvia 
from testifying.85 The privilege does not apply to out-of-court statements, so 
the state introduced a tape recording of Sylvia’s interrogation to rebut Mi-
chael’s claim that he acted in self-defense.86 
The trial court concluded that use of the recording did not violate Rob-
erts, because Sylvia had first-hand knowledge of the attack, was speaking in 
the heat of the moment, and was unlikely to lie to a police officer.87 The 
Washington Court of Appeals reversed88 and the Washington Supreme 
Court reversed again.89 Each court reached different conclusions about the 
reliability of Sylvia’s statements.90 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a third time, holding that the admis-
sion of Sylvia’s tape-recorded interrogation violated the Confrontation 
Clause.91 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court said that the lower 
courts’ application of Roberts revealed “a fundamental failure on our part to 
interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on 
judicial discretion.”92 Roberts’s fusion of the Confrontation Clause and the 
statutory hearsay rule led to a “[v]ague . . . manipulable” standard that was 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Mueller, supra note 79, at 320. 
 82 Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of 
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 192 (2005) (capi-
talization normalized). 
 83 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002) (en banc), 
rev’d, 541 U.S. 36. The State charged Michael with assault and attempted murder. Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 40. 
 84 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39–40. 
 85 Id. at 40. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 State v. Crawford, 107 Wash. App. 1025, 2001 WL 850119, at *1 (Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 
54 P.3d 656, rev’d, 541 U.S. 36. 
 89 Crawford, 54 P.3d at 658. 
 90 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. Compare Crawford, 54 P.3d at 664 (finding Sylvia’s testi-
mony trustworthy), with Crawford, 2001 WL 850119, at *5 (finding Sylvia’s testimony untrust-
worthy). 
 91 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. 
 92 Id. at 67. 
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incompatible with the “categorical constitutional guarantee[]” set out in the 
Confrontation Clause.93 The Roberts standard “depart[ed]” from “the origi-
nal meaning of the Confrontation Clause”94 and was “so unpredictable that 
it fail[ed] to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations.”95 
These failings necessitated a return to first principles. Citing opinions 
by Justices Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Stephen Breyer96 and the scholar-
ship of two law professors,97 the Court set forth a lengthy account of the 
historical origins of the right of confrontation. Based on this account, the 
Court concluded that where “testimonial” evidence was at issue, the Sixth 
Amendment required that the accused be afforded the right to confront the 
“witness” responsible for the evidence, even if that person was not a wit-
ness who gave testimony in a legal proceeding.98 The right was categorical. 
Any evidence containing a testimonial statement triggered a right of con-
frontation, regardless of how it was produced. Regardless of its reliability or 
importance to the case, testimonial evidence could be admitted without con-
frontation only if the individual responsible for the evidence was unavaila-
ble to testify at trial and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine that individual.99 The only narrow exceptions to this rule were 
those “established at the time of the founding.”100 
While holding that all “testimonial” statements implicated the Confron-
tation Clause,101 the Court “le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”102 “Various formulations” were 
possible.103 The Court stated that “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies 
at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”104 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. at 67–68. 
 94 Id. at 42. 
 95 Id. at 62–63. 
 96 Id. at 60–61 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140–43 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment)). 
 97 Id. at 61 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125–
31 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011 (1998)). 
 98 Id. at 68. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 54; see also id. at 62 (excepting forfeiture by wrongdoing); id. at 73 (excepting dying 
declarations). 
 101 Id. at 50. 
 102 Id. at 68. 
 103 Id. at 51. 
 104 Id. 
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Crawford thus promised three benefits. First, Confrontation Clause 
doctrine would henceforth be “faithful to the Framers’ understanding.”105 
Second, fidelity to the Clause’s “categorical . . . guarantee[]” would simpli-
fy regulation of criminal evidence by eliminating judicial discretion to de-
cide whether evidence could be admitted without an opportunity for con-
frontation.106 Third, revitalized, simplified doctrine would protect defend-
ants “against paradigmatic confrontation violations.”107 
Scholarly reaction to Crawford was generally favorable.108 Writing 
shortly after the decision, one commentator praised Justice Scalia as “the 
unlikely friend of criminal defendants”109 and presented Crawford as an 
example of the “successful blend of originalism and formalism.”110 Craw-
ford’s “formalistic rule” turned on “simple, clear requirements of testimony, 
cross-examination, and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of relia-
bility.”111 The rule was “rooted in the historical record,” and “serve[d] the 
historical goal of constraining judicial discretion and testing evidence be-
fore jurors’ eyes.”112 
C. The Breakdown of Contemporary Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence 
Post-Crawford jurisprudence did not deliver on these promises. This 
point is now widely recognized,113 so I offer only a single example here and 
return to the breakdown of contemporary Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence in Part III below.114 
One of the first problems the Court grappled with following Crawford 
was how the revitalized confrontation right applied to reports of forensic 
testing.115 Analysts—who may be unaware of whether their work will in-
culpate or exculpate a suspect—perform such testing in a controlled envi-
ronment using standard procedures.116 When analysts follow appropriate 
protocols, some forensic science disciplines—most notably Y-STR DNA 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. at 59. 
 106 Id. at 67. 
 107 Id. at 60. 
 108 See, e.g., Symposium, Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of 
the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 109 Bibas, supra note 82, at 183. 
 110 Id. at 192. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra notes 350–447 and accompanying text. 
 115 See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791 (2007) (demonstrating that the intersection of ex-
pert testimony and Crawford has become a serious practical concern for lower courts). 
 116 See Brian Caddy & Peter Cobb, Forensic Science, in CRIME SCENE TO COURT: THE ES-
SENTIALS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1, 10 (2d ed. 2004). 
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analysis—can identify the source of physical evidence with a high degree of 
accuracy and reliability.117 
Because of its perceived reliability, many state evidence codes permit 
courts to admit reports of forensic testing as evidence under exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.118 Under Crawford, however, a report’s admissibility under 
the hearsay rule is only the first step of the analysis. If a report of forensic 
testing is deemed to contain a testimonial statement, the accused is entitled 
to confront the analyst (or analysts) responsible for the statement.119 If the 
analyst does not—or cannot—testify, the report cannot be admitted. 
Two cases decided shortly after Crawford implied that forensic reports 
categorically triggered a right to confront the authors of the reports. In 
2009, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court held that three “certifi-
cates” reporting the results of drug testing were subject to the Confrontation 
Clause because they resembled affidavits and performed a function—
establishing facts pertinent to guilt—similar to live trial testimony.120 And in 
2011, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court reached the same conclusion 
with respect to a “Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis” introduced in a prose-
cution for driving under the influence.121 More consequentially, Bullcoming 
ruled that the prosecution cannot satisfy the confrontation requirement by 
calling a witness who is generally familiar with a laboratory’s procedures 
but who lacks personal knowledge of the specific test results offered into 
evidence.122 
In 2012, the temporary doctrinal stability ended with Williams.123 As 
the Introduction notes, the central evidence in Williams was trial testimony 
by a forensic analyst who concluded that the defendant was the source of 
semen collected from a rape victim.124 The analyst based her testimony on 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See generally COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 133 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT] (surveying research and proposing recommendations to improve the 
quality and reliability of forensic evidence). 
 118 See Brief of the States of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4185394, at *1A (collecting statutes from 
forty-two states and the District of Columbia). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not specifically 
address reports of forensic testing but provide a hearsay exception for “a statement that . . . is 
made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and . . . describes med-
ical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.” FED. 
R. EVID. 803(4). 
 119 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 120 557 U.S. at 308. 
 121 See 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716–17 (2011). 
 122 Id. at 2710 (“The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certifi-
cation, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to 
cross-examine that particular scientist.”).  
 123 See 132 S. Ct. at 2229–30 (plurality opinion). 
 124 See id. at 2229–30; supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.  
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her comparison of two DNA profiles. An Illinois state laboratory derived 
the first profile from a sample of the defendant’s blood, which had been 
collected while he was incarcerated on other charges.125 The analyst who 
generated this profile appeared as a trial witness and was cross-examined.126 
Cellmark Laboratories, a private laboratory that operated under contract 
with Illinois, generated the second profile from a rape kit collected shortly 
after the crime.127 No Cellmark employees testified at trial.128 
The question was simple—was testimonial evidence introduced in vio-
lation of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming?—but the Court splin-
tered. In ninety-two pages of slip opinions, the justices offered four ap-
proaches to determining whether a report of forensic testing triggered a 
right to confront the analysts who performed the underlying testing.129 None 
of the approaches attracted the support of a majority of justices.130 
A four-justice plurality consisting of the Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justices Anthony Kennedy, Breyer, and Samuel Alito offered two “independ-
ent” bases for concluding that the analyst’s testimony did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause. The plurality’s main rationale assumed that Cellmark’s re-
port was testimonial but never entered into evidence.131 As the plurality read 
the trial transcript, the analyst who testified did not vouch for the Cellmark 
report or even suggest that it was derived from the evidence in the rape kit 
collected from the victim. Instead, the analyst merely opined that the DNA 
profiles in the Illinois and Cellmark reports matched.132 In effect, her testi-
mony was that if the Cellmark report was derived from semen in the vic-
tim’s rape kit, Williams was the perpetrator.133 Appreciating the limited pur-
pose of the analyst’s testimony required extraordinary sophistication on the 
part of the factfinder. But there was no concern about jury confusion in Wil-
liams, because the case was tried to the bench and the trial judge was pre-
sumed to have applied the rules of evidence correctly.134 
The limited scope of the analyst’s testimony raised a question about 
the sufficiency of the evidence: If the Cellmark report did not enter into ev-
idence, how did the judge who presided over Williams’s trial know that re-
port was derived from the victim’s rape kit? But Williams did not argue that 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229 (plurality opinion). 
 126 Id. at 2230. 
 127 Id. at 2229. 
 128 Id. at 2228–29. 
 129 See Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505, slip op. (U.S. June 18, 2012); see also Williams, 132 
S. Ct. at 2221–76. 
 130 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion). 
 131 Id. at 2236. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 2236–37. 
 134 See id. 
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Cellmark could have accessed Williams’s DNA from a source other than the 
rape kit.135 The coincidence that Williams’s DNA matched the profile in 
Cellmark’s report provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude 
that Cellmark had in fact tested the rape kit.136 This analysis conflicted with 
Bullcoming, which held that the accused is entitled to be confronted with 
the “particular scientist” who conducted a forensic test whose results are 
introduced at trial.137 
Perhaps because of this conflict, the plurality offered a second rationale 
for upholding the admission of the Cellmark DNA report. On this rationale, it 
did not matter whether the Cellmark report entered into evidence, because the 
report was nontestimonial in any event.138 This was because Cellmark’s ana-
lysts were unaware of how their work product would be used.139 Because the 
analysts did not know whether their report would inculpate or exculpate Wil-
liams, they lacked the “primary purpose” of generating evidence for use in a 
criminal prosecution, and the Clause did not apply.140 This rationale conflict-
ed with both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.141  
Justice Elena Kagan, joined by three other justices, dissented.142 In her 
view, the plurality’s suggestion that the testifying witness’s opinion was 
“independent” of the Cellmark report was fiction.143 Furthermore, Melen-
dez-Diaz and Bullcoming foreclosed the conclusion that the Cellmark report 
was nontestimonial.144 
Justice Thomas cast the deciding vote. Like the dissent, he believed the 
testifying expert’s testimony could not be uncoupled from the Cellmark re-
                                                                                                                           
 135 Id. at 2238. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
 138 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion). 
 139 Id. at 2244. 
 140 Id.  
 141 See id.; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 
at 345 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In both of those cases, the dissents had advanced the same argu-
ment. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated in Melendez-Diaz: “Often, the analyst does not know the 
defendant’s identity, much less have personal knowledge of an aspect of the defendant’s guilt. The 
analyst’s distance from the crime and the defendant, in both space and time, suggests the analyst is 
not a witness against the defendant in the conventional sense.” 557 U.S. at 345 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). In Bullcoming, Justice Kennedy observed:  
In the New Mexico scientific laboratory where the blood sample was processed, 
analyses are run in batches involving 40–60 samples. Each sample is identified by a 
computer-generated number that is not linked back to the file containing the name of 
the person from whom the sample came until after all testing is completed. The 
analysis is mechanically performed by the gas chromatograph . . . . 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 142 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2270 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 2265–66 (citing Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305). 
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port.145 He also rejected the plurality’s conclusion that the Cellmark report 
was nontestimonial, reasoning that Cellmark’s employees must have known 
their analysis might be used in a criminal prosecution.146 Nevertheless, the 
Cellmark report lacked the “formality” and “solemnity” that Justice Thomas 
alone believes are essential to the applicability of the Confrontation 
Clause.147 Thus, Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality’s bottom-line 
conclusion that the report was nontestimonial.148 
Though five justices had voted to uphold Williams’s conviction, Jus-
tice Thomas’s rejection of the plurality’s reasoning led Justice Kagan to 
conclude their conflicting writings gave no way to determine when the use 
of forensic evidence complied with the Confrontation Clause.149 According-
ly, Justice Kagan made an extraordinary announcement: the dissenters 
would give no precedential effect to the Court’s judgment.150 
As the Kagan dissent suggests, the fractured writings in Williams do 
not yield a consistent answer as to whether a report of forensic analysis can 
be admitted without giving the accused an opportunity to be confronted 
with the report’s authors. Following Williams, the Supreme Court’s case law 
supports four approaches to that issue. They variously privilege: (1) the “in-
dependence” of expert testimony that relies on the report (the Williams’s 
plurality’s primary rationale);151 (2) the “primary purpose” of analysts who 
conducted the testing described in the report (the Williams’s plurality’s al-
ternate rationale);152 (3) the report’s functional similarity to trial testimony 
(the Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming rationale);153 and (4) the formality of 
the report (Justice Thomas’s approach in Williams).154  
The combination of these approaches and voting blocs yields sixteen 
possible outcomes for the basic fact pattern at issue in Melendez-Diaz, Bull-
                                                                                                                           
 145 Id. 2256–57 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 146 Id. at 2261. 
 147 Id. at 2260. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan noted that Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
rejected “every aspect of [the plurality’s] reasoning and every paragraph of its explication.” Id. at 
2265. 
 150 See id. (“[U]ntil a majority of this Court reverses or confines [Melendez-Diaz and Bull-
coming], I would understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the admission of 
forensic evidence”). 
 151 See id. at 2235–40 (plurality opinion) (privileging the ability of a testifying witness to 
offer an independent opinion about the source of physical evidence based on personal knowledge). 
 152 See id. at 2242–44 (privileging the prosecutorial or non-prosecutorial purpose of the un-
derlying testing). 
 153 See id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ.) 
(proposing to consider whether the forensic report substitutes for testimony that could be given by 
analysts involved in the underlying testing). 
 154 See id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (considering the formality of the 
report). 
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coming, and Williams.155 In four of these scenarios post-Williams, there are 
not five votes to admit nor deny the report.156 Six of the scenarios result in 
the exclusion of a forensic report if the accused is not given an opportunity 
to confront the report’s author, and the remaining six result in admitting the 
report. 
The uncertainty concerning reports of forensic testing157 well illus-
trates the current state of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.158 Such re-
ports, moreover, are only one part of the Court’s post-Crawford docket. Part 
III demonstrates that the Court has encountered similar difficulties articulat-
ing how Crawford applies to statements made to government officers in the 
aftermath of a crime.159 In other important areas, involving for example au-
topsy reports,160 statements to medical personnel,161 and non-hearsay state-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Where approaches (1) and (2) conflict neither is counted in the analysis in the text, be-
cause it is unclear whether the Williams plurality could attract a fifth vote to limit or overrule 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Of course, rather than counting votes one could identify Wil-
liams’s holding by identifying “that position taken by those [justices] who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Yet the fact 
that none of the opinions supporting the judgment in Williams did so on “narrow” grounds com-
plicates this analysis. 
 156 In these fact patterns, the Williams plurality’s rationales conflict, and the formality of a 
forensic report would not break the tie. Thus, whether the Court would admit the report is unclear. 
 157 See State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 665 (N.J. 2014) (“[T]he fractured holdings of Wil-
liams provide little guidance in understanding when testimony by a laboratory supervisor or co-
analyst about a forensic report violates the Confrontation Clause.”). 
 158 The occasional unanimous decision does not detract from confrontation doctrine’s under-
lying instability. For example, in 2015 in Ohio v. Clark, the Court unanimously concluded that a 
three-year-old’s statements to daycare teachers to the effect that his stepfather had beaten him 
were nontestimonial and therefore did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See 135 S. Ct. 
2173, 2177 (2015). In support of this conclusion, the Court observed that although the child’s 
statements “had the natural tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution,” there was “no indication 
that the primary purpose of the conversation was to gather evidence for [that] prosecution.” Id. at 
2181–83. Evidence of child abuse created an “ongoing emergency . . . . [T]he immediate concern 
was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help.” Id. at 2181. Ohio teachers have a statutory 
duty to report child abuse to police, but their questions to the child victim were “caring”; the 
teachers “undoubtedly would have acted with the same purpose whether or not they had a state-
law duty to report abuse.” Id. at 2182–83; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1) (West 
2015) (imposing a duty on certain officials to report suspected abuse of children). Statements by 
“very young” children “will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.” Clark, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2182. Moreover, “statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers . . . are much 
less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers.” Id. at 2181. Which of 
these points was essential to the Court’s conclusion that the Confrontation Clause did not apply 
was not obvious. The conclusion that the child’s statements were nontestimonial was based on “all 
the circumstances.” Id. 
 159 See infra notes 350–377 and accompanying text. 
 160 See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1238 (2007) (holding autopsy reports are subject to Confrontation Clause requirements). 
 161 See, e.g., United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 893 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 828 (2006) (holding the statement was not subject to Confrontation Clause requirements). 
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ments,162 the Court has gone a decade without granting certiorari to elabo-
rate Crawford’s meaning. 
Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, then, is far from 
the “successful blend of originalism and formalism” predicted immediately 
following Crawford.163 As regulation and applied constitutional theory, 
Crawford has failed. 
II. WHO ARE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE “WITNESSES”?: HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
What happened? As I will argue, the failure of the Crawford v. Wash-
ington regime created by the Supreme Court in 2004 is not primarily a fail-
ure of constitutional interpretation. That is, it was not the Court’s failure to 
appreciate the Clause’s textual meaning that precipitated the breakdown in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.164 Nevertheless, it is only with an un-
derstanding of the Clause’s textual and historical meaning that one can un-
derstand Crawford’s functional logic, the decision’s analytical oversights, 
and the ramifications of those oversights for confrontation doctrine and 
constitutional theory. 
This Part therefore demonstrates that the textual and historical mean-
ing of the Clause in no way compels the Court’s testimonial rule. Expand-
ing on an understanding first articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in 1836165 and later advanced in differing forms by Dean John 
Henry Wigmore,166 the second Justice John Marshall Harlan,167 and Profes-
sor Akhil Reed Amar,168 I show that those who enacted the Sixth Amend-
ment most likely understood the Confrontation Clause to give the accused a 
right to confront ordinary witnesses who appeared in a legal proceeding and 
gave live testimony. They would not have understood the accused’s “right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him” to subject anyone who 
generates “testimonial” evidence to confrontation.169 Nor would they have 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See, e.g., People v. Combs, 101 P.3d 1007, 1020 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1107 
(2005) (holding non-hearsay statements are not subject to Confrontation Clause). 
 163 Bibas, supra note 82, at 192. 
 164 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMM. 95, 101 (2010) (distinguishing interpretation of a constitutional provision from the con-
struction of implementing doctrine that carries the provision’s meaning into effect). 
 165 See Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434, 437–38 (1836). 
 166 See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1373, at 1711–12 (1904). 
 167 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94–95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
 168 See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor 
Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045–46 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment 
First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 647 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Foreword]. 
 169 Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (establishing the “testimonial 
rule”). 
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understood that right to define what evidence was or the conditions under 
which non-witness evidence could be admitted. 
Section A addresses threshold questions about interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause.170 Sections B and C describe the historical context in 
which the Sixth Amendment was adopted, and show that—because of the 
framing generation’s understanding of evidence—the Clause would have 
been understood to regulate only the testimony of ordinary witnesses.171 
Section D surveys historical evidence that confirms the accuracy of this in-
terpretation.172 
A. Procedural and Regulatory Models of the Confrontation Clause 
The central interpretative question presented by the Confrontation 
Clause is what the Clause means by a “witness” against the accused.173 The 
Clause’s applicability depends crucially on whether a person who makes a 
statement used as evidence is a “witness.” If so, the Clause by its plain 
terms gives the accused the right to be confronted with that person. If not, 
the Clause has no application. 
Initially, it is clear that the Confrontation Clause does not use the term 
“witnesses” in the sense familiar from everyday life. We might speak of 
“witnesses” to a crime or a car accident or the signing of a will, who have 
first-hand knowledge of the event. But the Clause does not use “witnesses” 
in this “eyewitness” sense. Its reference to “witnesses against [the ac-
cused]”174 implies that a person not only have information about a historical 
fact, but also that the information be used for a particular purpose—to prove 
guilt.175  
The distinction between eyewitnesses and people who might be called 
“accusatory” witnesses is apparent from the Sixth Amendment’s text. Be-
yond this, interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is more difficult. As 
the Supreme Court recognized in Ohio v. Roberts, the modern law of evi-
                                                                                                                           
 170 See infra notes 173–183 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 184–257 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 258–344 and accompanying text. 
 173 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause states that “[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id. 
“The Supreme Court has interpreted ‘confronted’ to mean, more or less, ‘cross-examined in the 
defendant’s presence.’” David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 
n.29, 37 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J, concurring in the result); Da-
vis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). Therefore the central interpretive question involves the 
meaning of “witnesses.” 
 174 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 175 See Amar, Foreword, supra note 168, at 647. As Professor Amar observes, “If I tell my 
mom what I saw yesterday, and she later testifies in court, I am not the witness; she is.” Id. But see 
Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1865, 1881–87 
(2012) (arguing that “witnesses against the accused” extends to eyewitnesses). 
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dence permits the use of many forms of evidence other than testimony of 
ordinary witnesses.176 A general theory of the Confrontation Clause must 
explain whether and how the Clause applies to this evidence.177 
In approaching that question, it is useful to contrast two theories of the 
Confrontation Clause: the “regulatory” model and the “procedural” model. 
Under the regulatory model, the Clause gives the accused the right to con-
front individuals who make particular kinds of statements that are used to 
establish guilt.178 This Article uses the term “regulatory” model, because 
this interpretation results in the Clause regulating what evidence consists of 
and the conditions under which evidence may be admitted. If the person 
responsible for a covered statement does not appear as a trial witness (and 
no exception applies), the statement may not be introduced as evidence. An 
evidentiary ruling made by Chief Justice John Marshall at Aaron Burr’s 
1807 conspiracy trial in the Circuit Court of the District of Virginia captures 
the “regulatory” view: “I know not . . . why a man should have a constitu-
tional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” Marshall 
wrote, “if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence 
against him.”179 
Alternatively, “witnesses against [the accused]” might refer to persons 
who appear in a legal proceeding and give live testimony.180 Under this 
“procedural” model, the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimony of 
individuals who are recognizably “witnesses against [the accused].” With 
respect to testimony of such witnesses, the Clause guarantees a right of con-
frontation. With respect to other forms of evidence, the Clause is silent. It 
does not address whether the person responsible for generating evidence 
must be made available for confrontation, nor does it address the kinds of 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (stating that the Clause, if applied literally, would “abrogate 
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme”), abrogat-
ed by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 177 See Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383, 385 (1990) (describing the two different approaches the 
Court has used to apply the Confrontation Clause).  
 178 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 
21939940, at *23 (arguing that the Confrontation Clause applies to “ex parte in-court testimony or 
its functional equivalent”); Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1239–40 (2002) (arguing that the “the core idea behind the Clause is to en-
sure that those who provide testimony against the accused do so openly, under oath, in the pres-
ence of the accused, subject to examination by the accused, and, if reasonably possible, at trial”). 
 179 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). 
 180 See Witness, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/witness 
[http://perma.cc/NR28-2G28] (defining “witness” as “a person who makes a statement in a court 
about what he or she knows or has seen”); see also Witness, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. 
LANGUAGE, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=witness&submit.x=38&submit.y
=25 [https://perma.cc/JG4T-8XVD] (defining “witness” as “[o]ne who is called on to testify be-
fore a court”). 
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information that can be used as evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt. 
This interpretation is captured by an 1836 decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.181 The Confrontation Clause on this view “was not 
intended to affect the question as to what was or was not competent evi-
dence to be given face to face according to the settled rules of the common 
law.”182 Whether statements by a person who was not a witness were “com-
petent evidence” depended on the common law of evidence, not the con-
frontation right.183 
B. The Original Understanding 
The historical context in which the Sixth Amendment was adopted 
strongly suggests that the procedural model captures the Confrontation 
Clause’s textual and historical meaning. At the framing, criminal evidence 
generally consisted of witness testimony, and a right of confrontation would 
have corrected a practice—the use of unconfronted witness testimony taken 
in pre-trial proceedings—that framing-era lawyers were familiar with. 
Within this context, the accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him” would have been understood to apply to ordinary witnesses—
nothing more, nothing less. 
1. “Evidence” at the Framing 
The framing-era criminal trial differed from its modern counterpart in 
important ways.184 Public, bureaucratic police departments did not yet exist, 
so private individuals performed many law enforcement functions.185 At 
times, a private “prosecutor” rather than a government lawyer represented 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 434 (applying Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’ 
Confrontation Clause: the accused shall have the right to “meet the witnesses against him, face to 
face”). 
 182 Id. at 437. 
 183 See id. 
 184 See generally J.M. BEATTIE, THE FIRST ENGLISH DETECTIVES: THE BOW STREET RUN-
NERS AND THE POLICING OF LONDON, 1750–1840 (2012); GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 
4141; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2005) [hereinafter 
LANGBEIN, ORIGINS]; PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN ENGLAND, 1740–1820 
(2000); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–
1880 (Thomas A. Green ed., 1989); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal 
Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 185 See, e.g., BEATTIE, supra note 184, at 235–52 (describing the origins of London’s Metro-
politan Police force); STEINBERG, supra note 185, at 92–149 (describing the origins of Philadelph-
ia Police Department); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (1993) (describing the development of the U.S. criminal justice system from the 
colonial period to the present). 
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the state.186 The accused was not consistently afforded the right to coun-
sel.187 Non-statutory crime could be prosecuted.188 
For purposes of understanding the Confrontation Clause, however, the 
most important feature of the framing-era criminal trial is the understanding 
of evidence upon which it was premised.  Lawyers today tend to understand 
evidence as any source of information that tends to prove or disprove the ac-
cused’s guilt that can be used without violating the law.189 Factfinders in mod-
ern criminal trials accordingly consider a wide range of materials: statements 
to police officers and other agents of the government, 911 calls, video surveil-
lance, documents, physical objects, expert reports, and, of course, testimony 
of witnesses who appear and testify, among other things.190 
In the late eighteenth century, attorneys and jurists understood evi-
dence differently.191 They believed that most sources of information were 
legally irrelevant to the determination of guilt, and insisted on proving facts 
through viva voce testimony of live witnesses.192 A judge of the Old Bailey, 
London’s main criminal court, captured this understanding when he wrote 
in 1789 that “[t]he most common and ordinary species of legal evidence 
consists of the depositions of witnesses taken on oath before the Jury, in the 
face of the Court, in the presence of the prisoner, and received under all the 
advantages that examination and cross-examination can give.”193 In his 
landmark 1828 dictionary, Noah Webster expressed much the same view: 
“The declarations of a witness furnish evidence of facts to a court and jury 
. . . .”194 The two existing historical studies of colonial criminal procedure, 
which focus on New York and New Jersey, likewise reflect a witness-centric 
understanding of evidence.195 Minute entries from colonial criminal trials 
reproduced in those studies do not distinguish between witness testimony 
and other forms of evidence; they describe witnesses who testified for the 
                                                                                                                           
 186 FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, at 21; LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 40; Thomas, 
supra note 41, at 686–91. 
 187 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, at 57–58; LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 167–77. 
 188 See generally United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (first holding that 
U.S. courts may not recognize common law crimes). 
 189 In the language of the Federal Rules, information is “relevant” and therefore admissible as 
evidence if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 190 See generally INGRAM, supra note 44 (detailing forms of evidence used in modern crimi-
nal proceedings). 
 191 LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 236–37. 
 192 See Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of Evidence 
Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1990). 
 193 R v. Woodcock (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352. 
 194 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 76 (1828), 
available at https://archive.org/stream/americandictiona01websrich#page/692/mode/2up [https://
perma.cc/9F88-QFJP]. 
 195 See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 41, at 629 n.81; Thomas, supra note 41, at 675. 
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prosecution simply as “Evidences for the King” and witnesses for the de-
fense as “Evidences” for the accused.196 For example, the minutes for the 
trial of Elisabeth Goble, tried in a New Jersey court in 1752 “for murdering 
a bastard child,” read: “Evidences for the Crown: Mary Rogers, Jemima 
Stay, Phebe Cole, Robert Arnold and Elisabeth Arnold; evidences for the 
defendant, Doctor Elijah Gillett.”197 
The assumption that evidence consisted of witness testimony had ori-
gins in the oath. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the oath was 
thought to provide a uniquely powerful guarantee that a declarant’s state-
ments were true.198 A late seventeenth-century tract opined that an oath be-
fore God was “[t]he greatest assurance, that a Man can give of the truth of 
his Testimony; the last result, the highest and utmost appeal that we can 
make.”199 Perjury was a grave sin: “[I]f one forswear one’s self, one virtual-
ly in so doing utterly forsakes God, and his Mercy and Truth.”200 
By contrast, statements that were not made under oath were considered 
too casual and ephemeral to rank as evidence. Lord Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, 
author of the leading eighteenth-century evidence digest, wrote that “noth-
ing can be more ‘indeterminate’ than loose and wandering ‘testimonies’ tak-
en upon the uncertain report of the talk and discourse of others.”201 Un-
sworn statements were “of no value in a court of justice, where all things 
were determined under the solemnity of an oath.”202 
The centrality of the oath is reflected in King v. Brasier,203 an appeal 
decided by the twelve judges of England’s common law courts in 1779, 
twelve years prior to the enactment of the American Bill of Rights. The de-
fendant had been convicted of raping a child based on testimony “by the 
                                                                                                                           
 196 GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 41, at 629 n.81; Thomas, supra note 41, at 675. The 
same equivalence between witnesses and evidence writ large is evident in a 1726 letter from New 
York Attorney General Richard Bradley to Deputy Attorney General Evert Wendell. See GOEBEL 
& NAUGHTON, supra note 41, at 630. Advising Wendell on how to prosecute a forcible entry case, 
Bradley directs Wendell to bind over the victims for trial and asks: “Have they not sons or daugh-
ters or [] servants who saw it? If they have, such are the best evidence . . . . Pray bind them to all 
give evidence for the King on the information filed last October term . . . .” Id. (quoting Letter 
from Richard Bradley, N.Y. Attorney Gen., to Evert Wendell, N.Y. Deputy Attorney Gen. (Jan. 
21, 1726). 
 197 Thomas, supra note 41, at 675. 
 198 See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 595 (1997); see 
also 2 GILBERT, supra note 42, at 889. 
 199 Fisher, supra note 198, at 606 n.104 (quoting JOHN ALLEN, OF PERJURY 15 (1682)). 
 200 Id. (quoting JOHN DAUNCEY, A GUIDE TO ENGLISH JURIES 49–50 (1682)). 
 201 2 GILBERT, supra note 42, at 890. Gilbert wrote the treatise near the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. It was published in six English and U.S. editions between 1754 and 1801. See 
T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 504–05 (1999) (providing 
bibliographical information). 
 202 2 GILBERT, supra note 42, at 889. 
 203 R v. Brasier (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202. 
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mother of the child, and by another woman who lodged with her, to whom 
the child, immediately on her coming home, told all the circumstances of 
the injury which had been done to her.”204 At trial, the mother and her lodg-
er repeated statements the child made to them in the immediate aftermath of 
the rape.205 However, the child victim “was not sworn or produced as a wit-
ness.”206 The judges found the testimony defective because the child was 
not sworn, and “no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon 
oath.”207 Because the child’s statements were not made under oath, they 
were not legal evidence. The judges directed a pardon for the accused.208 
The assumption that evidence consisted of witness testimony was also 
linked to the “best evidence” principle, which grew out of pleading practice 
in civil cases.209 As evidence began to develop into a distinct field of law, 
jurists insisted that facts be established through the “best” evidence a fact 
permitted.210 Following the early empiricists,211 the best evidence of histori-
cal events not memorialized in formal documents was thought to be testi-
mony of witnesses who experienced those events firsthand.212 
The importance of the oath and the best evidence principle combined 
in the common law’s most distinctive evidentiary practice: its seemingly 
categorical prohibition of hearsay.213 Today, hearsay has a precise, technical 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. The opinion did not refer to the child’s statement as hearsay or mention the developing 
“rule” against hearsay. See id. at 202–03. 
 208 Id. at 203. Recognizing the obvious injustice of the result, the judges ruled that a seven-
year-old could be sworn as a witness if she understood the nature and consequences of the oath. 
Id. at 202. This holding did not affect the outcome of Brasier, because the victim had not been 
sworn. 
 209 See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 236; see also Dale A. Nance, The Best Evi-
dence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1988); David L. Noll, A Reader’s Guide to Pre-Modern 
Procedure, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2015). 
 210 See Gallanis, supra note 201, at 505–09. The modern “best evidence” principle simply 
requires originals of certain types of evidence to be used, but accurate duplications will usually 
suffice. See FED. R. EVID. 1001–1004. 
 211 See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1748), reprint-
ed in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 585, 593–94 (Edwin A. Burt ed., 1939) 
(“[A]ll th[e] creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, 
transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience”); 
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690), reprinted in THE ENG-
LISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL, supra, at 238 (“All ideas come from sensation or 
reflection.”). 
 212 Gilbert wrote that “there is that faith and credit to be given to the honesty and integrity of a 
credible and disinterested witness attesting any fact” that the witness personally experienced “that 
the mind equally acquiesces therein as on a knowledge by demonstration” from first-hand experi-
ence. 1 GILBERT, supra note 42, at 3. 
 213 See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 233–46; WIGMORE, supra note 166, § 1361; 
Gallanis, supra note 201, at 504–05. 
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definition. As formulated in the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is (1) a state-
ment not made at trial, (2) offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted” 
in the statement, that (3) does not fall within a recognized exclusion from 
the hearsay rule.214 Framing-era lawyers understood “hearsay” more expan-
sively and used the term to refer to practically any evidence generated out-
side the context of a legal proceeding that was introduced at trial.215 Moreo-
ver, hearsay was a colloquialism rather than a term of art.216 
As a formal matter, framing-era courts’ position on the evidentiary 
value of hearsay was uncompromising. In both England and the colonies, 
judges repeatedly stated that hearsay was “no Evidence.”217 As this formula-
tion implies, the idea was not that hearsay, while probative of guilt, required 
regulation because of its propensity to mislead the jury.218 Rather, hearsay 
seems to have been treated the way a modern court would treat testimony 
based on psychic revelation. Even if the jury heard this “evidence,” it was 
inadequate as a matter of law—i.e., “no evidence”—to prove a fact that was 
part of the prosecution’s burden of proof.219 
                                                                                                                           
 214 FED. R. EVID. 801; see also id. rr. 802–807 (setting out modern hearsay rule and excep-
tions to it). 
 215 See Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-
Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 561 n.15 (2007). 
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GINS, supra note 184, at 236. 
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exception. Another rule is, that no evidence can be received but upon oath; and this excludes hear-
say evidence in general.”), and Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286, 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (“The 
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 218 See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) 
(providing a classic statement of this rationale). 
 219 LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 236. 
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Notwithstanding the legal nothingness of hearsay, eighteenth-century 
judges were far from rigorous in excluding it in criminal trials. Indeed, a 
number of cases for which records survive involve flagrant use of hear-
say.220 The exclusion of defense counsel221 undoubtedly accounts for some 
of these cases.222 Other examples perhaps reflect the fact that the partici-
pants in framing-era trials understood that hearsay was no evidence. Akin to 
the judge in a modern bench trial, who presumably applies the rules of evi-
dence without the assistance of objections, participants in framing-era trials 
may have heard hearsay yet understood that it could not reliably serve as 
evidence of guilt or innocence.223 
Eighteenth-century courts’ relaxed approach to excluding hearsay has 
prompted scholarly debate over when the hearsay “rule”—more precisely, 
the practice of preventing the jury from hearing hearsay to prevent influ-
ence by improper considerations—acquired the force of law.224 The primi-
tive nature of appellate decision-reporting in the framing era complicates 
the question, and rules of evidence “were largely subject to discretionary 
waiver by the presiding judge, because there was no realistic sanction for 
ignoring them.”225 Nonetheless, the inconsistent exclusion of hearsay evi-
                                                                                                                           
 220 See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 238–39 (collecting examples of hearsay being 
used without objection in Old Bailey proceedings); see also GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 
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tivity” to the hearsay rule in criminal cases by the 1730s, though hearsay continued to be heard 
through the 1780s. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 234–42. Gallanis concluded based on 
a review of evidence treatises and reported decisions that “very little change in the application of 
hearsay law occurred between 1754 and 1780, but that the 1780s were a period of considerable 
activity and that by 1800 much of the modern approach to hearsay was already in place.” Gallanis, 
supra note 201, at 503 (emphasis added). 
 225 Sklansky, supra note 173, at 5. 
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dence does not appear to have affected the framing era’s understanding of 
what constituted evidence. Treatises and court opinions almost universally 
held that hearsay was “no evidence,”226 with only a handful of exceptions 
discussed immediately below.  
2. Use of Pre-Trial Statements 
Despite the “insistent orality” of the eighteenth-century criminal tri-
al,227 statements made before trial were sometimes introduced as evidence 
of the accused’s guilt. Furthermore, the use of those statements would in 
some circumstances deprive the accused of the opportunity to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him or her. 
The most important category of pre-trial statements consisted of those 
made in proceedings under the “Marian” bail and committal statutes.228 
Named for Queen Mary I and enacted in the mid-sixteenth century, the Mar-
ian statutes regulated the process of pre-trial investigation and detention in 
England through the nineteenth century.229 
The central feature of Marian procedure was a pre-trial hearing used to 
initiate a criminal prosecution and freeze the evidence when events were 
fresh in the witnesses’ minds. The statutes authorized the local justice of the 
peace (“JP”)—typically a man of stature in the community, though not nec-
essarily a judge230—to hear criminal complaints brought by private par-
ties.231 When a private “prosecutor” brought a suspect (the “prisoner”) be-
fore the JP, the JP examined and gathered information from the prisoner 
regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime.232 If the statutory re-
quirements were satisfied, the JP would “bind over” the prosecutor, the ac-
cused, and the material witnesses for trial, in a process akin to modern-day 
bail.233 The defendant would be jailed, and the prosecutor and witnesses 
ordered to appear for trial with their appearance perhaps secured by a 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See supra note 217 and accompanying text (explaining that framing-era courts in both 
England and the colonies found hearsay to be “no evidence”). 
 227 LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 63. 
 228 See An Act Appointing an Order to Justices of Peace for the Bailment of Prisoners 1554, 1 
& 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 13 (Eng.); see also An Act to Take the Examination of Prisoners Suspected of 
Manslaughter or Felony 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar. c. 10 (Eng.). 
 229 See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 40–48; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING 
CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 5–125 (1974) (providing an account of the development of criminal 
prosecution during the sixteenth century); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and 
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
105, 128 (2005) (describing the Marian statutes); Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian 
Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 493–94 (2007) (same). 
 230 See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 46. 
 231 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 13. 
 232 Id. 
 233 LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 43–44. 
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bond.234 Within two days of the committal hearing, the JP was to summarize 
as much of the prosecutor’s, witnesses’, and accused’s statements “as shall 
be material to prove the felony” in a document known as a “deposition.”235 
Under a separate statute, coroners were required to investigate deaths that 
occurred within their jurisdictions236 and exercised powers similar to those 
of a JP.237 
Practice under the Marian statutes continued in the colonies. Some 
states simply followed the Marian statutes as part of the inherited law of 
England, while other states enacted their own, very similar versions of 
them.238 Legal historians note that “[t]he practice of subjecting criminal 
suspects to examination before justices of the peace . . . was commonplace 
in eighteenth-century America.”239 “Without exception, administrators of 
criminal justice in British North America made use of the process estab-
lished by the Marian committal statute.”240 
Consistent with the view that evidence consisted of testimony by live 
witnesses, individuals who gave testimony in a committal hearing were re-
quired to appear for trial and testify a second time. They sometimes failed 
to do so, however. A committal hearing witness might die before trial,241 be 
unable to travel,242 be “detained and kept back” by the defendant,243 or fail 
to appear for unknown reasons. When a committal hearing witness failed to 
appear for trial, the prosecution might seek to introduce the witness’s testi-
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 235 Id.; see also LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 184, at 41 (detailing deposition terminolo-
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 236 Coroner’s Act 1751, 25 Geo. 2 c. 29 (Eng.). 
 237 Coroners were instructed, at an inquisition for murder, manslaughter, or accessory thereto, 
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(2012). 
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 243 1 GILBERT, supra note 42, at 241. 
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mony from the committal hearing, which the JP or someone else present at 
the initial examination would recount.244 
The use of such testimony necessarily deprived the accused of an op-
portunity to confront adverse witnesses at trial. If the accused had not been 
given the opportunity to confront witnesses at the committal hearing, use of 
pre-trial testimony would deprive the accused of any opportunity for con-
frontation. Importantly, the lawfulness of this practice was unsettled during 
the framing era. As late as 1835, a South Carolina court surveying the Eng-
lish case law observed there was “great diversity of opinion on the question 
whether the [pre-trial] deposition of a deceased witness, taken in the ab-
sence of the accused, is or is not admissible on his trial.”245 The U.S. Su-
preme Court did not hold that an opportunity to confront a witness at a prior 
trial permitted use of the witness’s statements at a subsequent trial until 
1895.246 
In addition to testimony from Marian committal hearings, framing-era 
lawyers would have been familiar with three other kinds of pre-trial state-
ments used as trial “evidence.” The first were dying declarations of a person 
who had received a mortal injury, which were admissible when the declar-
ant was aware of his or her impending death.247 These statements were ad-
mitted on the theory that a “situation so solemn, and so awful [was] consid-
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at trial. 
 245 State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill.) 607, 609 (Ct. App. 1835). 
 246 See infra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 
237 (1895)). 
 247 See Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352. 
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ered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by 
a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.”248 
Secondly, pre-trial statements were used to corroborate the testimony 
of witnesses who testified at trial. In the eyes of contemporary jurists, such 
statements were not substantive evidence, but showed merely “that [the 
witness] affirmed the same thing on other occasions, and that the witness is 
still confident [i.e., consistent] with himself.”249 Gilbert offered the example 
of a fresh complaint of a crime: “though the positive proof resulting from 
such report be indefinitely small,”250 it showed that the victim (who Gilbert 
assumed was testifying as a trial witness) did not invent the crime after the 
fact. 
Thirdly, some pre-trial statements that today would be considered 
hearsay were admitted on the theory that they were the best evidence of a 
fact at issue. Thus, courts appear to have preferred that written documents 
establish matters such as contracts, land ownership, and pedigree, because 
documents were better proof than viva voce testimony.251 Similarly, proof of 
a defendant’s reputation in the community required the repetition of out-of-
court statements, because “from the nature of the subject no other [evi-
dence] can be expected.”252 
On the whole, however, the use of pre-trial statements at trials did not 
seriously challenge the view that evidence generally consisted of live wit-
ness testimony. The “most common and ordinary species of legal evidence” 
was testimony of trial witnesses who appeared and testified in person.253 
The most important kind of pre-trial statements used as evidence—those 
taken under the Marian statutes—were recognizably the testimony of wit-
nesses. Other pre-trial statements that appeared in framing-era criminal tri-
als were either not considered evidence (corroboration hearsay) or were suf-
ficiently rare (made in awareness of impending death or “better” evidence 
than live testimony) that they did not affect the general, witness-dominated 
character of the framing-era trial. 
3. How Did Framing-Era Lawyers Read the Confrontation Clause? 
Within this context, the Confrontation Clause would have been under-
stood in the sense captured by the procedural model described above. This 
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understanding would have expressed the framers’ views regarding the best 
methods for ascertaining facts and also corrected an abuse that they were 
familiar with—taking testimony in a pre-trial proceeding and using it at trial 
without affording the accused the confrontation right.  
Such a directive would have been a logical way of promoting the fair-
ness of criminal adjudication. In effect, the confrontation right prevented 
the federal government from bifurcating the processes of generating evi-
dence and adjudicating the defendant’s guilt. A right to confront ordinary 
witnesses ensured that witnesses made accusations face-to-face, when the 
presence of the accused underscored the gravity of the accusations and de-
terred the witness from lying. 
The right of confrontation furthermore provided a broad, if not com-
prehensive, guarantee that criminal cases were decided on the basis of a 
complete factual record. Confrontation ensured the court’s ability to resolve 
gaps and ambiguities in testimony through questioning and cross-
examination. And it ensured that the jury would have the opportunity to ob-
serve witnesses’ demeanor as they testified. 
As it happens, confrontation was well known to serve these functions. 
In 1604, the judges of the King’s Bench observed, commenting on the mer-
its of English and Scottish procedure, that “the Testimonies, being viva voce 
before the Judges in open face of the world, [is] much to be preferred before 
written depositions by private examiners or Commissioners.”254 Live testi-
mony allowed the court to observe the witnesses’ behavior on the stand, 
which provided the best opportunity to assess their credibility and draw out 
contradictions.255 
A directive giving the accused the right to confront the witnesses 
against him or her would not have been understood to hold that certain 
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statements trigger a right of confrontation regardless of the context in which 
they were made. To framing-era lawyers, the idea that the Clause regulated 
out-of-court statements would have been strange, because the legal effect of 
a statement depended critically on it having been made under oath or the 
speaker’s awareness of impending death.256 Because most statements were 
legally irrelevant to the determination of guilt—“no evidence,” in the eight-
eenth-century formulation—those who proposed and enacted the Sixth 
Amendment likely never considered the question of whether a hearsay de-
clarant was a “witness” and therefore subject to the confrontation require-
ment. 
Similarly, a directive giving the accused the right to confront the wit-
nesses against him or her would not have been understood to regulate evi-
dence generally. A right to be confronted with “witnesses” is not naturally 
read to define what evidence is or the conditions under which it can be ad-
mitted. Moreover, the suggestion that the Confrontation Clause requires all 
evidence to be presented through witnesses (which underlies Roberts’s er-
roneous statement that literal application of the Confrontation Clause would 
destroy all hearsay exceptions)257 cannot be reconciled with eighteenth-
century courts’ tolerance for forms of non-witness evidence such as docu-
ments, corroboration hearsay, and dying declarations. If the makers of these 
forms of evidence were witnesses to whom a right of confrontation at-
tached, the accused’s right to confront the witnesses against him or her 
would have barred their use—but we know it did not. 
This is not to say that those who enacted the Sixth Amendment were 
indifferent to the fairness and completeness of criminal evidence. Rather, 
the limited scope of the “historical” Confrontation Clause reflects the fact 
that the Clause is premised on a specific set of assumptions about the for-
mat criminal trials would take and the non-constitutional evidentiary prac-
tices governing them. The confrontation directive ensured fairness and ac-
curacy of a specific kind of evidence—witness testimony—because that 
kind evidence dominated the framing-era criminal trial. 
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C. Confirmatory Evidence 
The prior section argues that the procedural model of the Confronta-
tion Clause, not the regulatory model, most likely captures its textual and 
historical meaning. On this view, the Clause regulates the way in which tes-
timony of ordinary witnesses is taken; it does not regulate what evidence is 
or the conditions in which non-witness evidence may be used. This section 
surveys historical evidence that confirms the accuracy of this conclusion. It 
considers four historical sources that were central to the Court’s decision in 
Crawford: (1) framing-era dictionaries, (2) English state trials, (3) pre-
framing decisional law, and (4) post-framing decisional law. 
1. Dictionary Definitions 
To begin, the thesis that the procedural model captures the original un-
derstanding of the Confrontation Clause is consistent with the way in which 
framing-era dictionaries define “witnesses” and “testimony.” Dr. Samuel 
Johnson’s 1755 dictionary contains a single definition of “witness” that re-
fers to persons.258 It defines a “witness” as “[o]ne who gives testimony” and 
illustrates the definition with a quotation from Shakespeare’s Henry VIII: 
“The king’s attorney, . . . Urg’d on the examinations, proofs, confessions Of 
divers witnesses . . . .”259 
Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language 
gives five definitions of “witness.”260 One defines a witness as an eyewit-
ness.261 Of the remaining four definitions, only one makes grammatical 
sense in the context of the Confrontation Clause.262 That definition defines a 
“witness” as “[o]ne who gives testimony; as, the witnesses in court agreed 
in all essential facts.”263 
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It is true that Webster’s definition of “witness” references “testimony,” 
which Webster defines as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”264 But it does not follow, 
as Crawford maintained,265 that Webster believed anyone who gave testi-
mony was for that reason a “witness.” The “testimony” definition goes on to 
explain that “[s]uch [an] affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal 
or written, but must be under oath.”266 Webster thus contemplated that some 
testimony would be given by ordinary witnesses in legal proceedings and 
some would not. For example, he referred to the Gospels as the “testimony” 
of God, who clearly is not a witness subject to the confrontation right.267 
2. State Trials 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English governments con-
ducted a series of trials that became notorious for their use of unfair proce-
dure.268 The state trials are often thought to have motivated the Confronta-
tion Clause’s adoption.269 Crawford endorsed this view and relied on four of 
them: Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 trial for treason; the 1554 treason trial of 
Nicholas Throckmorton; the 1696 attainder proceedings against Sir John 
Fenwick; and John Lilburne’s 1637 trial before the Star Chamber.270 These 
cases also support the thesis that the procedural model captures the original 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 
a. Raleigh’s Case 
The most notorious of the state trials—and one that supports the pro-
cedural model of the Clause—was Raleigh’s.271 In a highly politicized pro-
ceeding, the result of which was preordained, the Crown sought to establish 
that Raleigh had participated in the “Bye conspiracy,” an aspect of a larger 
plot to depose the newly crowned James I and install Arabella Stuart in his 
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place.272 The prosecution’s case depended centrally on Raleigh’s own 
statements and two pre-trial examinations of his alleged co-conspirator, 
Lord Cobham, in which Cobham confessed to participating in the conspira-
cy and implicated Raleigh.273 
Raleigh conducted a brilliant pro se defense. When depositions of 
Cobham’s examinations were introduced, he responded that Cobham had 
recanted.274 In a celebrated speech, Raleigh demanded that Cobham be pro-
duced so that Raleigh could confront him over the inconsistencies in his 
accounts of the conspiracy. 
The two standard sources for the trial are Jardine’s Criminal Trials and 
Howell’s State Trials.275 Both were written for a popular audience and thus 
should not be considered verbatim transcripts. Jardine reports Raleigh stat-
ing:  
[I]t is strange to see how you press me still with my Lord Cobham, 
and yet will not produce him; . . . [H]e is in the house hard by, [i.e., 
the Tower of London] and may soon be brought hither; let him be 
produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this confession of 
his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof.276 
Crucially, the depositions of Cobham’s examinations summarized state-
ments of a person who was recognizably a witness. The English lawyer 
Harry Stephen observed that in trials of the time, the usual manner of pro-
ceeding was to introduce “the written account of statements made generally 
. . . to members of the Court, by persons whom it thought desirable to ex-
amine” prior to trial.277 That Cobham was examined in this manner is evi-
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dent from an exchange in which the Lord Chief Justice explained why Cob-
ham had been examined twice—an apparent departure from the procedure 
the Lords were familiar with: 
My Lords, when Lord Cobham was first examined upon interroga-
tories, he denied everything, but he refused to sign his Examina-
tion, standing upon it as a matter of honour, that being a Baron of 
the realm, his declaration was to be accepted without subscription. 
Notwithstanding, he said at last, that if I would say he was compel-
lable and ought to do it, then he would sign. Whereupon I, then ly-
ing at Richmond for fear of the plague, was sent for, and I came to 
the Lord Cobham, and told him he ought to subscribe, or it would 
be a contempt of a high nature; which presently after he did.278 
Cobham thus appears to have given evidence in a manner similar to the 
witness in a modern deposition on interrogatories.279 An officer of the court 
elicited his testimony through interrogatories and recorded it in a written 
document that was later introduced at trial. 
The Crown also relied on a letter by Cobham, which Attorney General 
Edward Coke produced in melodramatic flourish in the trial’s final 
minutes.280 In Crawford, the Court implied that Raleigh responded to 
Coke’s production of the letter by demanding that Cobham be produced.281 
But Raleigh made no such demand, nor did he need to. 
As Howell reports, Raleigh responded to the production of Cobham’s 
letter by “pull[ing] a Letter out of his pocket,” in which Cobham exonerated 
Raleigh of wrongdoing.282 Raleigh read this letter and proclaimed: “Now I 
wonder how many souls this man hath! He damns one in this Letter, and 
another in that.”283  
Insofar as Raleigh’s trial exemplifies the abuses the Confrontation 
Clause sought to regulate, its crucial feature is the Lords’ bifurcation of evi-
dence-creation and the adjudication of guilt. As the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court commented in the 1836 decision noted above, the constitu-
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Cobham hath, and the King shall judge by our deaths which of us is the perfidious 
man . . . . Hear now, I pray you, what Cobham hath written to me. 
Raleigh’s Case, 1 Jardine Crim. Tr. at 446–47. 
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tional right of confrontation protected against such “evidence by deposition, 
which could be given orally in the presence of the accused.”284 
b. Other State Trials 
Other notorious state trials also involved the same bifurcation of evi-
dence-creation and adjudication and thus provide strong support for the 
procedural model of the Confrontation Clause. They support the regulatory 
model weakly, if at all. For example, at Lord Throckmorton’s treason trial, 
the Crown sought to establish that Throckmorton had participated in the 
1554 rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt.285 The central evidence against 
Throckmorton consisted of confessions by Throckmorton’s alleged co-
conspirators, given in the same manner as Cobham’s confession and also 
recorded in written documents that were introduced at trial.286 
Similarly, in Fenwick’s attainder proceeding, the central evidentiary 
dispute was whether the testimony of a witness, Cordel Goodman, who had 
been examined by the Clerk of the House of Commons and “spirited away” 
by Fenwick’s wife, could be admitted.287 Fenwick was tried under a statute 
that authorized attainder proceedings against persons involved in a conspir-
acy to depose William III following the Glorious Revolution.288 A lengthy 
debate in the House of Commons focused on the fact that Fenwick had not 
been given the opportunity to question Goodman at the initial examina-
tion.289 The House voted to admit the testimony, though some members ar-
gued that doing so was inconsistent with “the forms of inferior courts of law 
[and] equity.”290 There is no question that Goodman was a witness in the 
ordinary sense of the term. The clerk of the House of Commons reported 
that Goodman took the oath on May 28, 1696.291 
Finally, Lilburn’s trial,292 which led to popular condemnation of the 
Court of Star Chamber, centered on allegations that he had printed and dis-
tributed “divers . . . scandalous Books.”293 The Lords’ primary evidence 
against Lilburn was the affidavit of a button-seller accusing Lilburn and 
another of printing seditious books in Holland.294 The report of Lilburn’s 
                                                                                                                           
 284 Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 437. 
 285 Throckmorton’s Case (1554), 1 How. St. Tr. 869 (Eng.). 
 286 See id. 
 287 Fenwick’s Case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591–92 (Eng.). 
 288 1812, 8 Will. 3 c. 4, reprinted in Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 547. 
 289 Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. at 603–07. 
 290 Id. at 603. Crawford described the House of Commons’ vote as “closely divided.” 541 
U.S. at 44. In fact, the vote was 218 “Yeas” to 145 “Nos.” Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. at 607. 
 291 Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 547. 
 292 Lilburn’s Case (1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Eng.). 
 293 See id. at 1321. 
 294 See id. 
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case was written by Lilburn and does not disclose how the affidavit was 
obtained; however, standard operating procedure in the Court of Star 
Chamber was to examine a witness prior to trial, record the testimony in a 
document that the witness certified, and then introduce the document at tri-
al.295 Even in summary ore tenus proceedings, used when the defendant 
“confessed” guilt (perhaps encouraged by torture), “the defendant had to 
have confessed freely the matter laid to his charge during examination by 
the Crown’s law officer.”296 
In short, the state trials generally involved live testimony that was giv-
en by witnesses in the ordinary sense of the term. The flaw in these pro-
ceedings was not the use of any out-of-court statements as a substitute for 
in-court testimony,297 but rather, the failure to “br[ing] hither”298 witnesses 
whose testimony, given ex parte in a prior stage of a criminal proceeding, 
was introduced at the trial as evidence of guilt.  
3. Pre-Framing Decisional Law 
Judicial opinions available to lawyers at the framing also support the 
thesis that the procedural model captures the original understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause. For present purposes, a workable sample of that case 
law is provided by the decisions Crawford relied upon as evidence of the 
Sixth Amendment’s original meaning. If any decision supported the broader 
regulatory model of the Clause, one would expect to find it cited in Craw-
ford, which maintained that the regulatory model reflects the original under-
standing. 
In addition to the state trials discussed above, Crawford relied on four 
English cases from the eighteenth century: King v. Woodcock,299 King v. 
Dingler,300 King v. Radbourne,301 and King v. Paine.302 All four involved the 
                                                                                                                           
 295 As one scholar explained, 
Either the examiner of the court or special commissioners examined such witnesses 
as were brought to their notice by either plaintiff [in criminal cases, the attorney 
general] or defendant, witnesses were then examined on oath and secretly, and their 
testimony, like that of the principals, written down and returned by the examiner or 
commissioners to the court. 
Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HIST. REV. 727, 738 (1913); accord 
Thomas G. Barnes, Star Chamber Mythology, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 5 (1961). 
 296 Barnes, supra note 295, at 5. 
 297 See Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: The Law of Treason, the Trial of 
Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 MISS. L.J. 869, 871 (2005). 
 298 Raleigh’s Case, 1 Jardine Cr. Tr. at 427. 
 299 (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352. 
 300 (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383. 
 301 (1787) 168 Eng. Rep. 330. 
 302 (1739) 87 Eng. Rep. 584. 
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interpretation and application of the Marian statutes. Three of these deci-
sions (Woodcock, Dingler, and Radbourne) refer to persons who testified in 
Marian committal proceedings as “witnesses”303—a usage of the term con-
sistent with the thesis that the procedural model captures the original under-
standing of the Confrontation Clause. Woodcock and Dingler go further and 
refer to persons who made statements outside the context of an ongoing 
legal proceeding using other terms.304 
King v. Paine, a misdemeanor libel case decided in 1696, is more 
equivocal.305 Paine wrote a libelous book and gave it to Brereton.306 Accord-
ing to the Modern Reports, Brereton “transmitted a copy thereof, through 
several hands to the Mayor of Bristol, which occasioned the Mayor to send 
for Brereton to examine him, which he did upon oath, but not in the pres-
ence of Paine.”307 Brereton died before Paine’s trial and the Crown moved 
to admit his statement to the Mayor.308 Paine objected on the ground that 
there was no legal authority for admitting the statement.309 The Crown re-
sponded that the evidence was given to a JP, and that evidence given to a JP 
was always admissible because JPs were permitted to administer the oath.310 
                                                                                                                           
 303 Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383 (“The prisoner was immediately apprehended, and taken 
before Robert Abingdon, Esq. a Magistrate for Westminster, who took the examination of the 
prisoner, and the information of the witnesses who then attended, pursuant to the statute of Philip 
and Mary.”); Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353 (referring to the Magistrate who took the out-of-
court deposition: “It was on in the discharge of that part of Mr. Read’s duty by which he is, on 
hearing the witnesses, to bail or commit the prisoner”); Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (“The 
Court received the deposition in evidence; but the fact having been committed at the dead of night, 
there was no positive evidence, either by the contents of [the victim’s] information, or by the sev-
eral witnesses who were examined viva voce, that the prisoner was guilty.” (citation omitted)). In 
R v. Westbeer (1739), 168 Eng. Rep. 108, the court admitted the statement of the deceased 
“Curteis Lulham, an accomplice, [who] had made a full confession in writing, and given infor-
mation upon oath against the prisoner before the Lord Chief Justice Lee pursuant to [the Marian 
statutes].” The case report does not refer to Lulham as a witness. 
 304 Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383–84 (“Garrow, for the prisoner, objected to the depositions 
thus taken being read in evidence, either as the dying declaration of a party conscious of ap-
proaching dissolution . . . or as a deposition taken pursuant to the statutes of Philip and Mary . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353 (referring to the “dying declaration of a per-
son who has received a fatal blow” (emphasis added)). 
 305 See 87 Eng. Rep. at 584. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 585. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. The prosecution argued: 
[T]he statute makes no difference in this case, for the power of a justice of peace to 
take examinations is not grounded upon it; for he might examine a criminal by vir-
tue of his office, and the statute only enforces the execution of his office by com-
manding him to take such examinations . . . . 
Id. 
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The puisne judge and justices of the Court of Common Pleas decided that 
the statement should not be admitted.311 
The grounds for the judges’ decision and the scope of the rule Paine 
established are subjects of extensive debate.312 Importantly, it is unclear 
whether Brereton was a witness in the ordinary sense of the term when he 
made his statement to the Mayor. Although the Mayor appears to have been 
a JP, it is not clear whether he was acting in his official capacity when he 
took Brereton’s statement.313 If so, Brereton could fairly be described as a 
“witness” in a nascent legal proceeding. If the Mayor simply placed Brere-
ton under oath and took his statement, the case for describing Brereton as a 
witness in an ongoing legal proceeding would be weaker. 
In sum, the pre-framing decisional law discussed in Crawford general-
ly supports the procedural model of the Confrontation Clause. Three of the 
four cases cited by Crawford use “witnesses” to refer to ordinary witness-
es—the usage that the procedural model assumes. Only Paine arguably 
supports the regulatory model, and it is ambiguous.314 
4. Early State Decisions 
In addition to the state trials and English cases already discussed, 
Crawford relied on early American state decisions reported between 1794 
and 1858.315 They too support the thesis that the procedural model captures 
the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 
One group of the early state decisions addressed evidence given in 
American versions of Marian committal proceedings.316 Unsurprisingly, 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See id. at 165. 
 312 Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (stating that Paine “settled the rule requiring a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination as a matter of common law” (emphasis added)), with Davies, 
supra note 229, at 137 (“[T]he judges actually ruled that valid depositions could not be taken in 
misdemeanor cases at all . . . . Paine did not hold any adverse implications for the admissibility of 
Marian depositions in felony cases.”), and Kry, supra note 229, at 507 (“The examination was 
excluded both because there was no opportunity for cross-examination and because there was no 
statutory authority to take examinations in misdemeanor cases, either ground alone being suffi-
cient to exclude.”). 
 313 See R v. Paine (1739), 91 Eng. Rep. 246 (“In an information for a libel against the Gov-
ernment, not guilty being pleaded, upon trial the Attorney-General offered in evidence depositions 
taken before a justice of peace relating to the fact, the deponent being since dead.”); R v. Payne 
(1739), 91 Eng. Rep. 1387 (“It was moved in B. R. that the information of B. (now dead) taken 
before a justice of peace might be read as evidence for the King in an information against the 
defendant for a libel . . . .”); R v. Pain (1739), 90 Eng. Rep. 527, 527, 1062 (“The Attorney-
General offers the examination of one Brereton, taken upon oath before the Mayor of Bristol (he 
being dead) . . . .”). 
 314 See supra notes 305–313 and accompanying text. 
 315 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49–50. 
 316 See United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132 (D. Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702); Richards, 35 
Mass. (18 Pick.) at 434; State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431 (1858); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 
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questions arose about whether testimony from committal proceedings was 
admissible when the witness failed to appear and testify at trial. Courts gave 
varying answers depending on variations in the fact patterns they encoun-
tered and their understanding of the common law of evidence.317 (The Sixth 
Amendment did not enter the analysis because it had not yet been incorpo-
rated.) In all of these decisions, the evidence at issue was recognizably live 
testimony of a witness given to a JP or coroner.318 
The other group of state decisions Crawford relied on involved witness 
testimony given in other kinds of legal proceedings: a civil deposition;319 
prior criminal trials;320 and an arrest warrant hearing.321 Again, courts gave 
varying answers to whether testimony from these proceedings was admissi-
ble if the pre-trial witness did not appear at trial.322 But in no case did a 
court consider evidence that was not the testimony of a live witness. The 
assumption was rather that when the testimony of a trial witness was una-
vailable, courts should consider admitting at trial the testimony of a witness 
from an earlier proceeding. In 1835, in State v. Hill, the court reasoned: 
[D]irect and cross examinations are the best means of eliciting the 
whole truth, and the manner of the witness is one of the tests by 
which to determine the degree of credit to which he is entitled; 
but this is not always attainable, and what a deceased witness, or 
one who from other causes has become incapacitated to give evi-
dence, has sworn on a former trial, is admitted on the principle 
that it is the best of which the case admits . . . .323 
                                                                                                                           
Rich.) 124 (Ct. App. 1844); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344 (1842); Johnston v. State, 10 
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58 (1821). 
 317 Compare Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 439–40 (excluding the statement of a committal 
hearing witness who died, because other witnesses could not recall the dead witness’s precise 
testimony), and Houser, 26 Mo. at 439 (excluding the statement of a committal hearing witness 
who left the jurisdiction prior to trial), and Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) at 131 (excluding a 
statement given to the coroner by a witness who died prior to trial), with Macomb, 26 F. Cas. at 
1137 (admitting the statement of a committal hearing witness who died prior to trial), and Bostick, 
22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) at 344 (same), and Johnston, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 58 (same). 
 318 See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 319 State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794). But see Kry, supra note 229, at 502–03 (sug-
gesting that the statement at issue in State v. Webb was taken under North Carolina’s equivalent of 
the Marian statutes). 
 320 E.g., Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479 (1850); Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. (5 
Rand.) 701 (1827); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807). 
 321 Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill.) 607. 
 322 Compare Kendrick, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) at 492 (admitting prior trial testimony), with 
Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 103 (excluding civil deposition testimony), and Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill.) 
at 611 (excluding testimony from an arrest warrant hearing); Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) at 229 
(excluding prior trial testimony); and Finn, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 704 (excluding testimony given at 
a prior trial by a witness who had since left the jurisdiction). 
 323 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill.) at 607 (emphasis added). 
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Insofar as these cases excluded evidence for lack of confrontation, they in-
volved testimony of ordinary witnesses. They did not grapple with whether 
a person who made a statement outside of an ongoing legal proceeding 
should be treated as a “witness” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 
As such, the early state decisions provide little support for the regulatory 
model of the Confrontation Clause. 
5. Later Sources 
Students of criminal procedure accustomed to debate over the admissi-
bility of hearsay may find it odd that the Sixth Amendment confrontation 
right extends only to witnesses in the ordinary sense of the term. Yet courts 
and commentators have long advanced this view, which the procedural 
model of the Confrontation Clause captures. 
Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides that in 
a criminal prosecution, “every subject shall have a right . . . to meet the wit-
nesses against him face to face.”324 In 1836, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that the Massachusetts confrontation right con-
trolled only the manner in which witness testimony was taken and not the 
persons who were required to testify as witnesses.325 According to the court, 
the Massachusetts confrontation clause was meant “to exclude evidence by 
deposition, which could be given orally in the presence of the accused, but 
was not intended to affect the question as to what was or was not competent 
evidence to be given face to face according to the settled rules of the com-
mon law.”326 In other words, the confrontation right attached only to evi-
dence offered by a person who, under “settled rules of the common law,” 
appeared as a witness.327 The confrontation right did not address questions 
such as whether a person who generated evidence was required to appear as 
a witness, and whether the confrontation right attached to evidence that was 
not generated by an ordinary witness.328 
At the federal level, the Supreme Court did not consider the Confron-
tation Clause in any depth until its 1895 decision in Mattox v. United 
States.329 Mattox was charged with murder, and his first trial ended in a 
                                                                                                                           
 324 MASS. CONST. art. XII. 
 325 Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 434. 
 326 Id. 
 327 See id. at 437.  
 328 See id. 
 329 156 U.S. 237. Prior to Mattox, the Supreme Court appears to have decided only a single 
case in which the meaning of the Confrontation Clause was disputed. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 
supra note 64, § 6356. That case held that if a witness was absent by the “procurement” of the 
defendant, the defendant could not invoke the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the use of the 
missing witness’s prior testimony. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) 
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mistrial.330 Before his second trial, two of the government’s witnesses who 
gave testimony at the former trial died.331 The reporter’s stenographic notes 
of their testimony at the first trial were admitted into evidence.332 This doc-
umented testimony constituted the “strongest proof” against the accused.333 
The question was whether Mattox’s opportunity to confront the witnesses at 
the first trial was enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.334 
The Supreme Court rejected Mattox’s argument that admission of this 
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause in terms that underscore the 
centrality of witnesses to the confrontation right:  
To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the tes-
timony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because 
death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his 
constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent . . . The sub-
stance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in 
the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, 
and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.335 
Nine years following Mattox, Dean Wigmore endorsed an understand-
ing of the Confrontation Clause similar to the procedural model in the first 
edition of his evidence treatise.336 The bulk of Wigmore’s treatise is devoted 
to elaborating the common law hearsay rule.337 However, Wigmore also 
considered the relationship between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation 
Clause, and concluded that the Clause was no obstacle to the admission of 
otherwise permissible hearsay.338 
The effect of the Confrontation Clause, Wigmore concluded, was that 
“as far as testimony is required under the Hearsay rule to be taken infra-
judicially, it shall be taken in a certain way, namely, subject to cross-
examination—not secretly or ex parte away from the accused.”339 The Con-
stitution did not prescribe what evidence consisted of or the form it should 
                                                                                                                           
 330 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. That the question was open at the time of Mattox casts doubt on Justice Scalia’s and 
Kry’s view that King v. Paine “settled,” as a matter of common law, the rule that an unavailable 
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 335 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44 (emphasis added). 
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take; it left that to the law of evidence.340 Rather, the Constitution pro-
scribed “what mode of procedure shall be followed—i.e. a cross-examining 
procedure—in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary law 
of evidence to be given infra-judicially.”341 
Wigmore’s view is not identical to what this Article terms the proce-
dural model of the Confrontation Clause. Wigmore thought the Clause ap-
plied to testimony given in court or “infra-judicially.”342 By contrast, the 
critical event that triggers the Confrontation Clause under the procedural 
model is testimony by a witness in an ongoing legal proceeding. The proce-
dural model therefore recognizes the Confrontation Clause’s applicability to 
witness testimony that is not given within the four walls of a court, as oc-
curred with coroner inquests and some Marian committal hearings.343 
Nevertheless, the procedural model shares one of Wigmore’s critical 
insights. Wigmore recognized that the confrontation right was not intended 
to regulate evidence generally—the premise of what this Article terms the 
“regulatory” model of the Clause. In Wigmore’s view, that function was 
performed by the law of evidence, which, because it is not codified in a 
Constitution, is able to change over time. 
Of course, even as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Mat-
tox Court, and Wigmore advanced a witness-centered interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause, other courts and commentators maintained that the 
Clause had a more expansive regulatory scope. As early as 1807, cases sug-
gested that any person who in any context makes a statement that is used to 
establish the accused’s guilt is effectively a “witness” with respect to whom 
the right of confrontation attaches.344 But given the text of the Sixth 
Amendment, the historical context in which it was adopted, early applica-
tions of the confrontation right to witness testimony, and the absence of ear-
ly applications of the confrontation right to evidence that is not the testimo-
ny of an ordinary witness, it is notable that respected courts and commenta-
tors have long followed the procedural model of the Confrontation Clause. 
The limited scope of what we might call the “original” Confrontation 
Clause does not mean that the Clause is irrelevant to the regulation of the 
many forms of non-witness evidence that figure in modern criminal trials. 
As the next two Parts describe, the government’s ability to generate harms 
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that a constitutional provision seeks to regulate without formally violating 
the law is a paradigmatic justification for recognizing an anti-evasion rule 
that extends the provision’s operational scope. As a textual and historical 
matter, however, the procedural model more accurately captures the Con-
frontation Clause’s original meaning. 
III. A THEORY OF CRAWFORD’S FAILURE 
Parts I and II of this Article describe the breakdown of the Supreme 
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following its 2004 decision in 
Crawford v. Washington and explain how those who adopted the Clause 
understood it. The framers most likely understood the Clause to give crimi-
nal defendants the right to confront ordinary witnesses—the premise of 
what this Article term the procedural model of the Clause. The Clause did 
not address the circumstances in which other forms of evidence could be 
admitted. With this baseline understanding, this Part returns to the Supreme 
Court’s failure in Crawford and subsequent cases to establish a workable 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
This Part demonstrates that the rule of Crawford is best understood not 
as a straightforward application of the Clause’s original meaning but as an 
attempt to regulate government evasion of the Clause made possible by the 
transformation in the understanding of evidence between the founding and 
the present day. Crawford, however, did not acknowledge that the task for 
doctrine was to regulate evidentiary practices that evade the core confronta-
tion right. It did not appreciate the differences among established concep-
tions of evasion and the regulatory strategies they entail. Moreover, Craw-
ford reasoned that the activities that should be regulated as evasion could be 
identified by interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s text—a method of inter-
pretation that was conceptually incapable of performing that task. These 
oversights precipitated the breakdown of contemporary Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence. 
Section A traces the path through which the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause came to turn on whether evidence contained a “testimonial” state-
ment.345 Section B demonstrates why this “testimonial rule” is best justified 
as an effort to control governmental evasion of the Clause.346 Section C 
identifies three errors in Crawford that led to the Court’s failure to regulate 
government evasion successfully.347 Section D discusses doctrinal ramifica-
tions of these failures.348  
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A. Origins of the Testimonial Rule 
A reading of the Court’s Crawford opinion does not immediately re-
veal its operational logic.349 On its face, the opinion appears to identify a 
body of doctrine that had departed from the original meaning of the Con-
frontation Clause and consider whether to overrule that doctrine. Having 
answered the overruling question in the affirmative, the opinion seems to 
lay down a legal test that is more faithful to the Clause’s original meaning. 
In fact, the operational holding of Crawford has nothing to do with histori-
cal meaning. 
The Crawford opinion made three central moves. To justify rejecting a 
quarter-century of precedent, the opinion first set out a lengthy critique of 
the Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts.350 As 
Part I explains, Roberts equated the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay 
rule and held that out-of-court statements did not implicate the Clause if 
they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or had “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”351 Drawing on scholarly and judicial criti-
cism of Roberts, the Crawford opinion decried Roberts as a “departure” 
from “the Framers’ understanding.”352 
Because Crawford rejected Roberts, the Court needed to develop a 
new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, the second and most 
lengthy section of the Crawford opinion traced the historical background to 
the Confrontation Clause.353 
Key to the Court’s account were the sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century state trials discussed in Part II, particularly the trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh.354 Quoting Jardine, the Court opined that “the justice of England 
has never been so degraded and injured” as in Raleigh’s case.355 In addition 
to the state trials, the Court described English and American cases from the 
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries in which courts discussed the use 
of testimony that was taken before trial.356 
Based on its survey of these sources, the Court concluded that by the 
time of the framing, “English law developed a right of confrontation.”357 Ac-
                                                                                                                           
 349 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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cording to the Court, the colonists knew this confrontation “right” and includ-
ed it in state constitutions that served as models for the Sixth Amendment; 
they applied the right in cases from the framing and antebellum periods.358 
This history supported two “inferences” about the Confrontation 
Clause’s meaning.359 First, the Court concluded that “the principal evil” the 
Confrontation Clause sought to address was the civil law practice of using 
transcripts of ex parte examinations as trial evidence.360 Second, the Court 
reasoned that the framers would only have permitted the use of testimony of 
a witness who did not appear at trial if he or she were unavailable to testify 
and if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.361 
The only exceptions to this rule were those recognized at the founding, such 
as for dying declarations.362 
Having set forth its understanding of the Confrontation Clause’s histori-
cal meaning, the Court finally turned to defining the Confrontation Clause’s 
operational scope. As Part II demonstrates, framing-era lawyers generally 
understood criminal “evidence” to consist of witness testimony. Today, 
however, “evidence” includes an array of material other than witness testi-
mony that would have been unimaginable to the framers.363 Because of the 
transformation in the understanding of evidence, the Crawford Court had to 
address how the Confrontation Clause applied, if at all, to the many forms 
of non-witness evidence that are used in modern criminal trials.364 
Perhaps because the point had not been briefed, the Court did not con-
sider the possibility that the Clause applies only to ordinary witnesses.365 
However, the Court disposed of Wigmore’s thesis that the Confrontation 
Clause regulates “in-court testimony” in three short sentences.366 Wigmore’s 
view, the Court asserted, “would render the Confrontation Clause powerless 
to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”367 
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The Court then announced Crawford’s operational holding: the Con-
frontation Clause applies to all evidence that contains a “testimonial” state-
ment.368 The Court did not offer examples of framing-era cases in which 
non-witness evidence was excluded on the ground that it was “testimonial” 
and the defendant had not been afforded a right to be confronted with the 
maker of the evidence. Nor did the Court identify a single historical prece-
dent in which the “testimonial” formulation was material to a court’s analy-
sis of the admissibility of hearsay. Instead, the critical paragraph of the 
opinion relied entirely on quotations from Webster’s 1828 dictionary.369 The 
Court’s analysis proceeded in two steps: (1) a witness was someone who 
bore testimony. Therefore, (2) all “testimony” was subject to the Confronta-
tion Clause. 
At least some members of the Court must have known that this logical 
fallacy370 grossly distorted the Clause’s historical meaning. As Part II 
demonstrates, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court discussed a variety of 
historical sources that suggest the Clause was originally understood to apply 
to ordinary witnesses.371 Dissenting from the Court’s central holding, Jus-
tice Rehnquist objected that the testimonial rule was “no better rooted in 
history than our current doctrine.”372 
The Court insisted, however, that the original textual meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause compelled the testimonial rule.373 In addition, it empha-
sized that the Clause’s scope turned on its textual meaning, not the Clause’s 
underlying regulatory objectives. Justice Scalia wrote that the Clause ulti-
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mately strives to ensure the reliability of evidence.374 Yet the confrontation 
right—a procedural rather than substantive guarantee—commands that this 
reliability be assessed through “testing in the crucible of cross-examina-
tion.”375 
The upshot of the Court’s analysis was that the “testimonial” concept 
determined the scope of the Confrontation Clause. As the Court would soon 
clarify, the fact that evidence contained a testimonial statement was both 
necessary and sufficient to subject the evidence to the Confrontation 
Clause.376 If evidence was testimonial, it could not be admitted (save for a 
few narrow exceptions) unless the responsible witness was unavailable and 
the accused had a prior opportunity for confrontation.377 
B. Testimony and Evasion 
In the voluminous literature on the post-Crawford Confrontation 
Clause, a basic point has gone virtually unnoticed: application of the Clause 
to all testimonial evidence expands the Clause’s scope far beyond its histor-
ical scope.378 At the framing, the accused’s “right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him” would have been understood to apply only to ordi-
nary witnesses. Those witnesses would not necessarily have testified at trial; 
a witness might testify at a Marian committal hearing and fail to appear for 
trial, for example.379 But they would have been “witnesses” in the ordinary 
sense of the term and not what today are termed hearsay declarants. 
By contrast, the Confrontation Clause under Crawford applies to any 
evidence that incorporates a testimonial statement, regardless of whether the 
speaker is an ordinary witness and regardless of the context in which evi-
dence is created. Instead of the live testimony of a witness serving as the 
trigger, the introduction of evidence deemed to contain “testimonial” speech 
triggers the right under Crawford. The question is why a nominally 
originalist decision expanded the Clause so far beyond its historical scope. 
The answer lies in the need to regulate evasion of the basic confronta-
tion right. Although the Court’s claim that the testimonial rule captures the 
Clause’s original meaning is false, the impulse for recognizing that rule is 
obvious once one acknowledges the sea change in the understanding of evi-
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dence between the founding and the present day. Eighteenth-century jurists 
and lawyers generally understood criminal evidence as the testimony of 
witnesses.380 In contrast, under modern understandings reflected in the Fed-
eral Rules, evidence today is anything that “has any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”381 The rules 
of evidence generally and the hearsay rule in particular express a weak 
preference that evidence be presented through trial witnesses. Nevertheless, 
as Professor John Leubsdorf has observed, live testimony is often a “Trojan 
horse” for facts the testifying witness cannot personally vouch for,382 and, as 
the Roberts court stated, the hearsay rule is “riddled with exceptions.”383 
Because “evidence” today includes sources of information other than 
witness testimony, the right to confront witnesses has become an under-
inclusive guarantee of two values the Confrontation Clause protects—
evidentiary fairness and completeness. The right of confrontation continues 
to guarantee the fairness and completeness of witness testimony, whether 
given at trial or before.384 But the government can use substitutes for wit-
ness testimony to obtain criminal convictions that are not subject to the core 
confrontation right because they are not testimony of an ordinary witness 
against the accused. For example, in United States v. Proctor, a 2007 Fifth 
Circuit case mentioned in the Introduction, the prosecution secured 
Kendrick Proctor’s conviction using the transcript of a 911 call that substi-
tuted for what Yogi Proctor would have testified to, had he been called as a 
trial witness and cross-examined.385 
Seen from this perspective, the extension of the Confrontation Clause 
to all testimonial evidence is best seen in functional terms, as the recogni-
tion of an anti-evasion rule. More precisely, the Crawford rule is best un-
derstood as an effort to prevent the government from using substitutes for 
witness evidence that impermissibly circumvent the defendant’s basic con-
frontation right. In holding that testimonial, non-witness evidence is subject 
to the Clause, the Court imposed on that evidence the guarantee of fairness 
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and completeness that the Sixth Amendment explicitly provides for witness 
testimony.386  
The expansion of a constitutional criminal procedure right to address 
evasion of the right made possible by social change is not without prece-
dent. Indeed, the Court’s handiwork in Crawford has parallels to its ap-
proach to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.387 
Since the late nineteenth century, the privilege has been understood to 
prohibit the use as evidence of pre-trial confessions that are not voluntarily 
given.388 In the first half of the twentieth century, changes in police interro-
gation practices resulted in a large number of confessions that, if not the 
product of physical violence, did not reflect a suspect’s voluntary choice to 
confess.389 As a police manual instructed, interrogation “for a spell of sever-
al hours” or “for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but 
with no respite from the atmosphere of domination” could “induce the sub-
ject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion.”390 
In 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court famously held that 
if a custodial arrestee was not given the familiar warnings before confess-
ing, the confession could not be used as evidence of guilt.391 Miranda’s le-
gitimacy is the subject of continuing debate.392 But the rule it established is 
                                                                                                                           
 386 I take no position on whether individual justices or the Court as a whole were subjectively 
motivated by the desire to regulate evasion. For justices who recognized that the testimonial rule 
was not compelled by the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning, the perceived need to regulate 
practices that evaded the core confrontation right in a normatively problematic manner must have 
been a dominant consideration. The present claim, however, is not about the justices’ motivations 
but about the functional logic of Crawford’s testimonial rule. The need to regulate evasion of the 
Clause provides the best functional explanation for the Court’s recognition of the testimonial rule, 
I argue, and for the Court’s subsequent inability to elaborate a workable confrontation regime. 
 387 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”). 
 388 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886); see also Katharine B. Hazlett, The 
Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 J. 
AM. LEGAL HIST. 235, 237 (1998) (describing the development of this understanding of the privi-
lege). 
 389 See THOMAS & LEO, supra note 238, at 129–40, 151–61 (describing the transition from 
“the third degree” to “professional” interrogation practices during J. Edgar Hoover’s leadership of 
the FBI). 
 390 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 451 (1966) (quoting CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956)). 
 391 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 392 For entry points into debates over Miranda’s legitimacy, compare Joseph D. Grano, Mi-
randa’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 
(1988) (contending that courts may not legitimately promulgate rules intended to further compli-
ance with constitutional norms because the promulgation of rules that do not track constitutional 
meaning is not an exercise of “[t]he judicial power” recognized in Article III), and Joseph D. 
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. 
U. L. REV. 100 (1985) (same), with Evan H. Caminker, Lecture, Miranda and Some Puzzles of 
“Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (contending that judicial recognition of such 
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persuasively defended as a response to police circumvention of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege through interrogation practices that obscured the vol-
untariness of pre-trial confessions.393 By supplementing the fact-dependent, 
perjury-prone standard of the voluntariness test with a more easily adminis-
tered proxy (were the warnings given?), Miranda counteracted interrogation 
practices that traded on ambiguity over whether a particular confession was 
involuntary and thereby undermined the Fifth Amendment privilege.394 
The voluminous literature on Miranda attests that the style of constitu-
tional interpretation the Court relied on there is more controversial than in-
terpretation that purports simply to apply the Constitution’s textual mean-
ing. Part IV returns to these debates; for now, the key point is the functional 
similarity between Miranda and Crawford. If interpreted consistently with 
its textual and historical meaning, the Confrontation Clause does not direct-
ly regulate evidence that is not the statement of a “witness against the ac-
cused.” The law’s tolerance for such evidence permits the government to 
secure criminal convictions through evidence that may be inferior to wit-
ness testimony in its fairness and completeness. Just as Miranda responded 
by expanding the reach of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Crawford re-
sponded by expanding the reach of the Confrontation Clause. 
C. Crawford’s Errors 
Although the impulse to regulate evasion of the Confrontation Clause by 
expanding its regulatory reach is understandable, the way in which Crawford 
did so is flawed. The Court’s errors were threefold: the Court failed to (1) 
acknowledge that it was regulating evasion, (2) grapple with important ques-
tions regarding the scope of its new anti-evasion rule, and (3) choose an ade-
quate method to define activities that should be treated as evasive. 
1. The Understanding of “Evasion” 
To begin with, Crawford did not acknowledge that the task for doctrine 
was to regulate evidentiary practices that evaded the Confrontation Clause. 
The Court’s lack of candor might have been harmless if not for the uncertain-
ty over the activities that warrant regulation as “evasion.” Centuries-old de-
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bates over how to distinguish tax avoidance and tax evasion,395 as well as 
more recent work in criminal theory, show that the reasons for proscribing 
evasion are unsettled.396 Indeed, the very meaning of the concept is contested. 
At least three ways of understanding “evasion” might be used to regu-
late evasion of the Confrontation Clause: the substance over form approach, 
mental state approach, and purposive approach. 
The substance over form approach is premised on the idea that the law 
should concern itself with the substance of regulated actors’ actions, not 
immaterial details that do not affect the “real” nature of those actions. Ac-
cordingly, this approach understands “evasion” as activity that is “material-
ly similar” or “functionally equivalent” to activity proscribed by law.397 In 
the confrontation context, such an approach would regulate the use of evi-
dence that, if not the testimony of a witness, served a similar function—i.e., 
establishing guilt. 
The mental state approach is premised on the idea that it is problemat-
ic for regulated actors to act with conscious intent to evade the law, or with 
knowledge that they are engaging in a substitute for activities the law pro-
scribes.398 Accordingly, this approach treats a regulated actor’s actions as 
“evasive” if they are undertaken with a prohibited mental state—most obvi-
ously, intent to evade the law. In the confrontation context, the approach 
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might proscribe the use of substitutes for witness testimony if the prosecu-
tion specifically intended to strip the accused of her confrontation rights in 
generating or using evidence (an intent standard), or if the individual who 
made a statement was aware that it would be used as evidence (a knowledge 
standard). 
The purposive approach defines “evasion” as conduct that, even if 
technically legal, conflicts with the objectives of a norm.399 The emphasis 
here is on whether activity conflicts with the background objectives of the 
relevant norm rather than an actor’s state of mind. In the confrontation con-
text, the approach would regulate evidentiary practices that are inconsistent 
with the Clause’s purposes, however those purposes are understood. 
2. Selecting an Anti-Evasion Rule 
The Court’s failure in Crawford to acknowledge that doctrine was reg-
ulating evasion led to its second error: it overlooked important questions 
about the scope of its new anti-evasion rule and the normative basis for pro-
scribing activity that it deemed evasive. Approaches to regulating evasion 
differ not only in how they conceptualize “evasion” but also in the regulato-
ry strategies they entail. Doctrine directed at actions that are “functionally 
equivalent” to unlawful activities will look different than doctrine directed 
at regulated actors’ states of mind, both of which look different from doc-
trine that seeks to vindicate a law’s underlying purposes. 
Moreover, different approaches to regulating evasion present different 
bundles of costs and benefits. Consider two of the relevant dimensions: an 
approach’s ability to respond to novel forms of evasion, and the degree of 
guidance it provides to regulated actors. The substance-over-form approach 
gives the legal system great flexibility to respond to novel forms of evasion, 
because it catches all activities that are “equivalent” to the proscribed ac-
tivity, but provides little guidance to regulated actors other than an instruc-
tion not to tread too closely to the line.400 The mental-state approach pro-
vides a high degree of certainty to regulated actors; to avoid being sanc-
tioned for evading the law, an actor need only avoid the forbidden mental 
state.401 But for the same reason, the approach may fail to reach novel forms 
of evasion. The purposive approach gives the legal system a high degree of 
flexibility to respond to novel forms of evasion, provided a norm’s purposes 
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are sufficiently broad. That feature, however, is in tension with rule of law 
values. The broader a norm’s purposes, the more difficult it will be for regu-
lated actors to understand the activities that will be sanctioned as evasive.402 
Because of differences along these and other dimensions, a legal poli-
cymaker cannot decide simply to regulate “evasion” of a norm. Identifying 
evasion and an appropriate strategy for regulating it instead requires a poli-
cymaker to employ a normative theory that explains why particular activities 
should be considered evasive, and to weigh the tradeoffs among strategies for 
regulating those activities. Just as the design of primary norms requires a pol-
icymaker to weigh the costs and benefits of different modes of regulation—ex 
ante versus ex post, rules versus standards, civil liability versus criminal, 
etc.403—so do decisions about regulating evasion. By failing to acknowledge 
the task for doctrine, Crawford avoided these questions entirely. 
3. Distinguishing Evasive Activity from Activity That Is Directly Regulated 
Crawford’s third error involved the method the court did use to define 
the scope of its anti-evasion rule. Recall that the testimonial rule rests on the 
Sixth Amendment’s reference to “witnesses against . . . the accused.”404 
With the aid of Webster’s 1828 dictionary, the Court reasoned that the con-
frontation right applies to all forms of “testimonial” evidence, because 
“witnesses” are persons who give “testimony.”405 
The style of textual interpretation the Court used to define the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause is incapable of identifying which activities should 
be regulated as evasive. The goal of textual interpretation is to discover the 
“original meaning” or “original understanding” of the norm being interpret-
ed.406 By contrast, a policymaker undertaking to regulate evasion must de-
termine which activities should be regulated notwithstanding the fact that 
they do not violate the basic, textually defined norm. Under any possible 
model, evasive activities do not violate a legal norm directly but work 
around it in an impermissible manner. Textualist interpretation cannot an-
swer whether an activity is evasive in this sense. 
Crawford, then, left things as follows. In holding that the Confronta-
tion Clause applied to all testimonial evidence, the Court undertook to regu-
late evidentiary practices deemed to involve evasion of the Clause. Yet the 
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Court did not consider the different ways evasion can be understood or the 
tradeoffs among strategies for regulating evasion. Finally, it reasoned that 
“evasive” evidentiary practices could be identified through an interpretative 
method—textualist interpretation—that was incapable of resolving those 
questions. 
D. Doctrinal Consequences 
Once these features of Crawford are recognized, the Court’s inability to 
develop a workable Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in subsequent cases 
is easy to understand. At the Supreme Court level, post-Crawford doctrine has 
focused on two forms of evidence: (1) statements to government officers re-
sponding to reports of crime, and (2) reports of forensic testing. In both areas, 
Crawford’s errors impeded the development of doctrine that would success-
fully regulate governmental evasion of the Confrontation Clause. 
1. Post-Crime Statements 
The Court first grappled with identifying the activities that should be 
regulated as evasion in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, a pair 
of cases decided jointly in 2006.407 The cases presented two variations on 
the same fact pattern. In Davis, the prosecution introduced a recording of a 
911 call made by a domestic abuse victim.408 In Hammon, the prosecution 
introduced an affidavit signed by a domestic violence victim, which memo-
rialized a statement the victim gave to a police officer after calling 911 and 
reporting abuse.409 The victims did not testify at trial, although they appar-
ently could have been subpoenaed.410 
Neither victim was a “witness against the accused” in the sense con-
templated by the framers of the Confrontation Clause. They did not give 
live testimony in a legal proceeding. Thus, the crucial question for the Court 
was whether use of the victims’ statements should be regulated as evasion 
of the basic confrontation right. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas proposed that the Court an-
swer that question by examining the prosecution’s reasons for using the 
statements.411 Justice Thomas has long maintained that the Clause applies of 
its own force only to witness testimony and “formalized testimonial materi-
als, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”412 In 
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Davis, he proposed that even if the Clause did not apply to the victims’ 
statements of its own force, it would apply “if the prosecution attempted to 
use out-of-court statements as a means of circumventing the literal right of 
confrontation”413—that is, if the prosecution specifically intended to strip 
the accused of his or her Confrontation Clause rights. 
The Court rejected Justice Thomas’s understanding of the Confronta-
tion Clause as insufficiently protective but did not engage his suggestion 
that it use a specific-intent test to identify evasion of the Confrontation 
Clause.414 Having done so, however, the Court needed to identify which 
forms of non-witness evidence implicated the Confrontation Clause. 
As in Crawford, the Court did not acknowledge the differences among 
forms of evasion that the law can regulate, the tradeoffs presented by the 
regulatory strategies different forms of evasion entail, or the need for a 
normative theory to identify practices that should be deemed evasive. To 
answer whether the post-crime statements were testimonial and thus cov-
ered by the Confrontation Clause, the Court instead focused on “the primary 
purpose of the interrogation.”415 If an interrogation sought “to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,”416 the 
resulting statements were testimonial. If an interrogation lacked such a pur-
pose, the resulting statements were nontestimonial.417 
The Court’s new primary purpose test reflects a mental-state approach 
to regulating evasion. Like Justice Thomas’s proposed test, the primary 
purpose test equates evasion with a particular mental state. Where the Court 
differs from Thomas is the mental state that subjects evidence to the Con-
frontation Clause. Under the primary purpose test, statements are testimoni-
al if actors involved in an interrogation are aware that the interrogation is 
structured so as to generate evidence that could be used at trial to establish 
the defendant’s guilt.418 The test rests on an intuition that criminal evidence 
should be produced under trial conditions. If participants in an interrogation 
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know they are generating evidence and fail to appear for trial, statements 
from the interrogation are inadmissible. 
There are at least two difficulties with this test. First, the notion that 
“good” evidence is uniquely produced under trial conditions is at war with 
modern theory of knowledge and evidence codes based on that theory.419 As 
those codes recognize, many of the most important decisions in life, from 
where to enroll in college to whether to undergo a medical procedure, are 
based on information that is not produced under trial conditions. 
Second, because much information that is not produced under trial 
conditions has evidentiary value, a test that turns on awareness that the in-
formation could be used as evidence has no logical stopping point. If rele-
vant, admissible evidence is anything that “has any tendency to make a 
[material] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence,”420 awareness that a statement could be used as evidence does not 
meaningfully constrain the universe of statements subject to the Confronta-
tion Clause. The only constraint is the legal sophistication of those involved 
in an interrogation—which, in the case of government officers, is often 
high. 
As such, the line between evidence-generating and non-evidence-
generating interrogations is fictional. As Justice Thomas observed, police 
officers responding to crime are trained “both to respond to the emergency 
situation and to gather evidence” for use in a later prosecution.421 Giving 
one of these purposes primacy requires courts to identify a mental state that 
often does not exist. 
In 2008, in Giles v. California, the Court had an opportunity to recon-
sider the activities that should be regulated as evasion of the Confrontation 
Clause.422 The defendant shot and killed his girlfriend.423 To rebut his claim 
of self-defense, the State introduced statements the victim made three 
weeks prior to the shooting, to the effect that the defendant had threatened 
to kill her if he caught her cheating.424 The defendant claimed that the use of 
these statements denied him the right to be confronted with the “witness” 
that he indisputably shot and killed. Giles thus invited analysis of whether 
the use of pre-trial statements amounts to evasion of the Confrontation 
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Clause when an intervening cause—there, the defendant’s killing of the de-
clarant—caused a declarant’s inability to testify as a trial witness. 
The Court, however, assumed the Confrontation Clause applied425 and 
considered whether the defendant had forfeited his right to confrontation 
under a common law hearsay exception known as the “forfeiture by wrong-
doing” doctrine.426 Based on historical descriptions of the exception, the 
Court held that defendants forfeited their Confrontation Clause rights only 
when they specifically intended to interfere with the criminal justice sys-
tem.427 Because the defendant killed out of wrath, and not to interfere with 
the criminal justice system, the victim’s statements could not be admitted. 
The result grated: the victim’s statements could not be introduced, even as 
rebuttal evidence, because the state did not give the defendant a formal op-
portunity to cross-examine his victim before he killed her. 
In 2011, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court encountered yet another op-
portunity to grapple with the evidentiary practices that should be regulated 
as evasion of the Confrontation Clause.428 The fact pattern raised the same 
question as Giles: whether the use of pre-trial statements should be regulat-
ed as evasion when the defendant caused the declarant’s inability to appear 
as a trial witness. In Bryant, a drug dealer shot a client who escaped to a 
nearby gas station.429 At the gas station, police interrogated the victim about 
the shooting for five to ten minutes.430 An ambulance took him to the hospi-
tal, where he died.431 The victim’s statements were introduced at trial. 
The Court held in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor that the use 
of the interrogation at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause,432 but 
its reasons were puzzling. According to the Bryant decision, the victim’s 
statements were nontestimonial because (1) the officers who conducted the 
interrogation had a purpose other than generating criminal evidence (osten-
sibly, they sought primarily to apprehend “an armed shooter, whose motive 
for and location after the shooting were unknown”);433 and (2) the excite-
ment of being shot meant the victim was unlikely to lie.434 With respect to 
the latter point, Bryant reasoned that Davis’s primary purpose test was “not 
unlike” the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, which admits 
                                                                                                                           
 425 See id. at 358. 
 426 See id. at 358–68. 
 427 Id. at 368. 
 428 See 562 U.S. 344. 
 429 Id. at 348. 
 430 Id. at 349. 
 431 Id. 
 432 Id. at 371–78. 
 433 Id. at 374. 
 434 Id. at 361. 
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statements on the theory that “the declarant, in the excitement, presumably 
cannot form a falsehood.”435 
Bryant’s focus on reliability reflects a purposive approach to regulating 
evasion of the Confrontation Clause. Bryant reads the Clause as a protection 
against the use of unreliable evidence; statements that a judge deems relia-
ble do not trigger a right of confrontation because they do not implicate this 
objective. But this account of the Clause’s purposes ignores the historical 
practices that are thought to have motivated the Clause’s enactment, as well 
as the way in which confrontation improves the fairness of the criminal 
proceedings.436 Moreover, the claim that the Clause merely guarantees evi-
dentiary accuracy conflicts with Crawford’s holding that the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees a procedural right that operates independently of the reli-
ability of evidence proffered by the prosecution.437 As understood by Craw-
ford, the Confrontation Clause does not command that evidence be reliable, 
but rather that its reliability be tested through cross-examination.438 Under 
Bryant, the availability of this procedural right turns on a judge’s ex ante 
assessment of evidentiary reliability. These views are incompatible. 
Bryant’s incompatibility with Crawford prompted a strong dissent 
from Justice Scalia and academic defenders of Crawford.439 Although cor-
rect on its own terms, the criticism overlooked the underlying issue. Craw-
ford, Davis, Giles, and Bryant all grappled with how to define the forms of 
non-witness evidence that should be regulated as evasion of the Confronta-
tion Clause while advancing different theories of what constitutes evasion. 
Because Crawford framed the question as one of constitutional meaning, 
neither the cases nor the commentary were argued in those terms. 
2. Reports of Forensic Testing 
Crawford’s failure to acknowledge the task for doctrine or consider 
which form (or forms) of evasion to regulate, and its use of an inapt inter-
pretative tool to determine the scope of its anti-evasion rule, led to a similar 
breakdown in doctrine on the use of forensic evidence. 
                                                                                                                           
 435 Id. at 361–62 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 832, 828–30). 
 436 See supra notes 256–257 and accompanying text (discussing framing-era lawyers’ likely 
understanding of the forms of evidence subject to confrontation). 
 437 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 438 Id. 
 439 See, e.g., Bryant, 562 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 
64, § 6371.5 (calling Bryant “reprehensible”). Perhaps the most sympathetic reading of the Bryant 
decision sees it as an example of the critical race theory technique of “dismantling the master’s 
house using the master’s tools.” Symposium, I. Bennett Capers, Reading Michigan v. Bryant, 
“Reading” Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 427, 434 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/reading-michigan-v-bryant-reading-justice-sotomayor [http://perma.cc/6JYW-XLXB]. 
2015] Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle 1961 
As Part I explains, post-Crawford doctrine has vacillated on whether 
reports of forensic analysis are testimonial and the circumstances in which 
an expert witness who is not involved in forensic testing can present the 
results of such testing at trial.440 In 2012, in Williams v. Illinois, a plurality 
coalesced around the position that an expert can introduce the results of 
testing that he or she did not personally perform.441 But the Williams plurali-
ty holds together only if the test results recounted by the testifying expert 
are not memorialized in a “formal” or “solemnized” document.442 Mean-
while, at least one lower court has complained that “the fractured holdings” 
of Williams do not provide proper guidance as to when laboratory supervi-
sor or co-analyst testimony regarding a forensic report violates the Confron-
tation Clause.443 
By this point, the causes of this doctrinal confusion are apparent. Fo-
rensic analysts are not ordinary witnesses. Thus, the central question is 
whether using reports of forensic testing without affording the accused an 
opportunity to confront the responsible analysts amounts to evasion of the 
Confrontation Clause. To answer that question, doctrine must recognize the 
differences among competing conceptions of evasion and use a normative 
theory that identifies the activities to be regulated as evasion. The justices 
differ in their positions on those questions. One bloc of the Court has con-
cluded that reports of forensic testing present no risks that warrant regula-
tion under the Confrontation Clause.444 Another bloc has taken the position 
that the risks of forensic evidence are in all ways equivalent to those of un-
confronted witness testimony, mandating application of the confrontation 
requirement jot-for-jot.445 Justice Thomas uniquely maintains that the risks 
of scientific evidence are irrelevant unless the evidence is presented in a 
“formal” or “solemnized” document—in which case the confrontation re-
quirement applies with full force.446 
* * * * 
In sum, Crawford reads as an originalist decision, but its most im-
portant analytical move had nothing to do with the historical meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment. The decision expanded the reach of the Confrontation 
Clause to any evidence that embodied a testimonial statement, supported 
only by a conclusory assertion that doing so was necessary to avoid “fla-
                                                                                                                           
 440 See supra notes 113–163 and accompanying text. 
 441 See 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2244 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 442 See id. at 2259–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 443 See State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 665 (N.J. 2014). 
 444 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2242 (plurality opinion). 
 445 See id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 446 See id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
1962 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1899 
grant inquisitorial practices” and a pair of quotations from Webster’s 1828 
dictionary.447  
The Court did not initially acknowledge the most compelling function-
al justification for this move—the need to regulate evasion of the Confron-
tation Clause enabled by the transformation in evidence between the found-
ing and the modern day. To this day, only Justice Thomas has put forward a 
theory of how far the Court’s new anti-evasion rule should extend or ex-
plained the government practices likely to involve evasion of the Confronta-
tion Clause. Despite the fact that strategies for policing evasion present var-
ying bundles of costs and benefits, the Court has not considered the optimal 
strategy for policing evasion of the Clause. 
In hindsight, it is clear how these oversights prevented the development 
of workable Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. When the Court was called 
on to decide cases where the use of non-witness evidence did not intuitively 
involve evasion of the confrontation right, it splintered because of the founda-
tional uncertainty over the function that the doctrine was performing. 
IV. LEARNING FROM CRAWFORD 
The preceding Parts offer an answer to the puzzle at the heart of this 
Article. The Supreme Court’s inability to establish workable Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence in the decade since it decided Crawford v. Washington 
in 2004 results from Crawford’s unsuccessful attempt to regulate govern-
mental evasion of the basic right to be confronted with witnesses who offer 
live testimony at trial or in a pre-trial proceeding. Although the sea change 
in evidence between the founding and the present day creates a pressing 
need for doctrine that performs this function, Crawford ignored important 
questions a policymaker undertaking to regulate evasion of a legal norm 
must answer. Further, it impeded the development of workable doctrine by 
failing to distinguish between evidence that triggers confrontation because 
it is directly regulated by the Confrontation Clause, and evidence that trig-
gers confrontation because the government engaged in evasion. 
This Part concludes by explaining some of this account’s implications 
for confrontation doctrine and constitutional theory. It argues that the 
Court’s failure to regulate evasion of the Confrontation Clause successfully 
in Crawford and subsequent cases suggests a decision tree, or structured set 
of choices, for courts asked to regulate seemingly evasive activity. This ap-
proach promises to improve the legitimacy, effectiveness, and coherence of 
anti-evasion doctrine. Section A outlines the decision tree for regulating 
constitutional evasion.448 Section B situates it within the broader literature 
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on constitutional interpretation.449 Finally, although this Article cannot ad-
dress all of the doctrinal issues that remain open following Crawford, sec-
tion C illustrates the benefits of the decision-tree approach by applying it to 
the category of evidence at issue in Crawford, Davis v. Washington, Giles v. 
California, and Michigan v. Bryant: statements to government officers made 
in the aftermath of a crime.450 
A. Regulating Constitutional Evasion: A Decision-Tree Approach 
The lessons taken from Crawford depend on how one understands the 
federal courts’ lawmaking authority in the area of constitutional criminal 
procedure.451 According to some jurists and scholars, courts lack authority 
to promulgate doctrine that does anything more than apply the Constitu-
tion’s text.452 On this “pure interpretative” model of judicial authority, the 
task for courts adjudicating constitutional claims—including claims that a 
governmental actor has evaded a constitutional norm—“is basically one of 
interpretation, the application of fixed and binding norms to new facts.”453 
For those who subscribe to the pure interpretive model, the lesson of the 
Crawford experience is simple: regulation of non-witness evidence through 
the Confrontation Clause is illegitimate.454  
Most jurists and scholars, however, understand the courts’ authority to 
extend beyond merely applying constitutional meaning.455 For them, the 
question is what the failure of contemporary Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence teaches about the design of court-made constitutional doctrine. When 
undertaking to regulate activity that appears to involve evasion of a consti-
tutional norm, how can courts avoid creating the deeply unstable doctrine 
that characterizes post-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence? An 
important recent article demonstrates that the type of problem Crawford 
grapples with is pervasive; concerns about evasion “touch all areas of con-
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stitutional law.”456 Yet surprisingly little scholarship considers how such 
doctrine is created.457 
Here, Crawford holds valuable lessons. Like a plane crash or train de-
railment, the Court’s failure to develop workable Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence following Crawford has value as a case study of how to ap-
proach a problem that regularly appears. More concretely, the Crawford 
experience suggests that when undertaking to regulate activities that appear 
to involve evasion of a constitutional norm, courts must answer a predicta-
ble set of questions concerning the scope of evasion-regulating doctrine and 
the normative basis for subjecting “evasive” activities to regulation. Ad-
dressing these questions does not eliminate the need to engage difficult 
questions of constitutional interpretation; there is no universal answer to 
how courts should respond to constitutional evasion. But it directs judicial 
attention toward questions that are essential to the formulation of workable 
doctrine, and thus promises to improve the legitimacy, coherency, and effec-
tiveness of doctrine that regulates constitutional evasion. 
1. The Scope of the Primary Norm 
Crawford first teaches that the beginning point for regulating constitu-
tional evasion is to understand the scope of the evaded norm. At the root of 
the Crawford regime’s failure is the Court’s failure in Crawford to distin-
guish between evidence that is subject to the Confrontation Clause because 
it is the testimony of a “witness against the accused” and evidence that is 
subject to the Clause because it reflects governmental evasion of the Clause. 
To avoid repeating this mistake, courts asked to regulate evasion of a consti-
tutional norm should initially inquire whether the putatively evasive activity 
falls within the basic scope of the norm being evaded. If, for example, the 
use of recorded 911 calls appears to involve evasion of the defendant’s right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the first question is wheth-
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er the Confrontation Clause applies the calls’ use as evidence of its own 
force. 
Answering this question requires that courts distinguish between doc-
trine that applies a provision’s textual meaning and doctrine that regulates 
evasion of the provision—a distinction revisited in section B. It does not 
entail a commitment to a particular method of constitutional interpretation, 
however. So long as a method of interpretation seeks to explain what it 
means, textually, for “the accused [to] enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him,”458 it is capable of answering whether the 
provision applies of its own force. The analysis is therefore compatible with 
leading schools of constitutional interpretation, including those that associ-
ate constitutional meaning with original understanding,459 historical usage 
and practice,460 moral principle,461 and the interplay of these sources. 
2. The Regulatory Response 
If the “evasive” activity does not fall within the basic scope of the con-
stitutional provision it implicates, the next question is whether it warrants a 
regulatory response. In Crawford, the Court assumed that the answer was 
yes. The Court thought it inconceivable that the Clause would only apply to 
testimony given “infra-judicially.”462 But this was intellectually lazy. Activi-
ties that initially appear evasive may not warrant regulation depending on 
how a court understands evasion, and not all forms of evasion are legiti-
mately regulated through court-promulgated doctrine. 
Crawford teaches that, to answer whether putatively evasive activity 
warrants regulation, a court must understand the different ways governmen-
tal action can evade a constitutional norm and use an interpretative theory 
that answers whether the government’s actions create an impermissible state 
of the world. To continue the above example, the use of 911 calls might be 
considered evasive for a number of reasons: because live trial testimony 
could convey the same information; because the use of the calls is incon-
sistent with the Confrontation Clause’s objectives; because the prosecution 
intends to deprive the accused of the right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; or for other reasons. 
Answering whether a particular practice constitutes evasion requires a 
court to consider the normative basis for regulating evasion and its authority 
to regulate it. Again, many interpretative approaches are capable of answer-
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ing these questions, but at least with respect to the kind of procedural norms 
at issue in Crawford, I contend that a focus on constitutional harm is partic-
ularly useful. Both originalist and non-originalist decisions recognize that in 
addition to proscribing certain activities through conduct-regulating rules, 
the Constitution seeks to prevent specific end states.463 What characterizes 
these states of the world is the presence of harm the Constitution sought to 
regulate, produced through actions that do not necessarily violate the Con-
stitution’s conduct-regulating provisions. The presence of such harm, not-
withstanding actors’ technical compliance with the law, is a paradigmatic 
justification for recognizing an anti-evasion rule. Colloquially, the regulated 
actor takes advantage of the formal structure of law to get off on a techni-
cality. 
A hypothetical posed by Professor Amar illustrates the benefits of a fo-
cus on constitutional harm.464 Suppose that in the middle of a criminal trial, 
proceedings are adjourned and the prosecutor, jury, and judge repair to the 
judge’s chambers to hear the story of W, an eyewitness to the crime. When 
trial resumes the next day, the prosecutor offers a video of W’s story as evi-
dence of the defendant’s guilt.465 Because the court’s actions so obviously 
create a harm the Confrontation Clause was intended to regulate, it is natu-
ral to insist that the defendant be given the right to confront W. And in fact, 
the case law so holds: absent special circumstances, W’s testimony cannot 
be taken outside the defendant’s presence.466 
In the three-part typology of Part III section C, a focus on constitution-
al harm reflects a purposive approach to regulating evasion.467 Activity that 
does not fall within the basic scope of a constitutional provision is deemed 
evasive if it conflicts with the provision’s underlying objectives. As noted 
above, a purposive approach gives the legal system a high degree of flexi-
bility to respond to novel forms of evasion.468 In addition, it organizes activ-
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ity that the substance-over-form and mental state approaches struggle to 
classify, in a way that has an obvious foundation in constitutional authority. 
Return to Professor Amar’s example. Recording W’s testimony in the 
judge’s chambers seems to involve an intention to evade the Confrontation 
Clause. It results in the use of evidence that is functionally similar to wit-
ness testimony insofar as the videotape is used to prove the defendant did 
the crime. But those facts are neither necessary nor sufficient to the conclu-
sion that the defendant should be afforded the right to confront W. On the 
one hand, the fact that the court took W’s testimony in chambers for inno-
cent reasons—for example, because the courtroom air conditioning broke—
seems irrelevant to the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to confront 
W. On the other, the fact that evidence functions similarly to witness testi-
mony seems inadequate to trigger the confrontation right in all circumstanc-
es. For example, if the defendant had threatened to kill W when she testi-
fied, the judge’s actions would seem to be justified. 
Focusing on a norm’s underlying objectives reconciles these intuitions. 
In the air-conditioning scenario, the processes of evidence-creation and ad-
judication bifurcate in a manner analogous to the historical practices that 
motivated adoption of the Confrontation Clause. In the threat-to-kill scenar-
io, the State does not deny the defendant an opportunity to confront his ac-
cuser, but uses a substitute for confronted witness testimony out of necessi-
ty. Because the first scenario directly implicates the Confrontation Clause’s 
regulatory objectives whereas the second does not, it is natural to regulate 
the first but not the second as evasion of the Confrontation Clause. 
To be sure, successfully regulating evasion through the purposive ap-
proach requires courts to identify the purpose (or purposes) a norm serves 
with enough precision to identify activities that implicate that purpose. As 
the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence shows, that task imposes 
high informational and analytical demands. Lacking authoritative evidence 
of what the framers hoped to accomplish in the Confrontation Clause, jus-
tices have variously said that the Clause seeks to ensure the accuracy of 
criminal adjudication,469 the fairness of criminal proceedings,470 and the in-
trinsic value of looking one’s accusers in the whites of their eyes.471 On 
multi-member courts, a purposive approach to regulating evasion further 
requires that a stable majority of judges share the same understanding of a 
norm’s objectives over time.472 Nevertheless, analysis of purpose is a staple 
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of constitutional argument473 and many areas of doctrine informed by pur-
posive analysis lack the instability of post-Crawford doctrine.474 The rela-
tive stability of these areas of doctrine suggests that informational and ana-
lytic burdens do not create an insurmountable barrier to regulating evasion 
through a purposive approach. 
3. The Source of Authority 
If apparently evasive activity warrants a regulatory response, the next 
question is whether regulation should be implemented under the specific 
provision being evaded or under a broader source of authority, such as the 
Due Process Clause. In Crawford, the Court assumed that the appropriate 
remedy for the use of evidence that involved evasion of the confrontation 
right was to give the accused the right to confront the individual who gener-
ated the evidence, and exclude evidence where an opportunity for confron-
tation was not provided.475 In closer cases, the choice of an appropriate 
remedy—and the textual authority for that remedy—will turn on two fac-
tors: the obviousness of the evasion, and the means-end fit between the 
primary constitutional provision and the regulatory response the court be-
lieves appropriate. 
The obviousness of evasion is pertinent because where evasion is ob-
vious, regulating it through the primary norm will likely address the harm 
created by the evasive activity. In Professor Amar’s hypothetical, it is natu-
ral to insist that the accused be given an opportunity to confront W because 
the court’s actions obviously involve evasion of the Confrontation Clause. 
The means-end fit between the primary constitutional provision and 
the desired regulatory response is relevant because applying the primary 
provision to evasive conduct will not remedy the underlying constitutional 
harm in all circumstances. Suppose a court concluded, following Ohio v. 
Roberts and Michigan v. Bryant, that the Confrontation Clause seeks pri-
marily to prevent criminal convictions based on unreliable evidence.476 The 
use of unreliable forensic reports might create a constitutionally impermis-
sible end-state, but it is questionable whether confrontation is an appropri-
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ate remedy. Cross-examination of forensic analysts appears to do little to 
ensure the reliability of the underlying analysis.477 Thus, doctrinal interven-
tions would more profitably focus on the scientific bases for analysts’ con-
clusions, institutional sources of error, and the presence or absence of 
standards and best practices in the laboratory conducting the underlying 
testing.478 Such remedies are more naturally implemented through the Due 
Process Clause, which has long been understood to regulate the use of par-
ticularly unreliable evidence generated through state action.479 
4. Candor 
Finally, Crawford teaches that when writing a decision, a court under-
taking to regulate evasion of a constitutional provision should acknowledge 
the function that the doctrine is performing. The Court’s inability to develop 
a workable Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following Crawford sug-
gests that this specific form of candor is crucial to the development of 
workable doctrine. As discussed in the following section, candor further-
more flags the possibility that Congress may legitimately play a role in reg-
ulating evasion. 
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B. The Legal Status of Anti-Evasion Doctrine 
The suggestion that courts should consider how to implement evasion-
regulating doctrine prompts a series of questions about the legal status of anti-
evasion doctrine. Within the U.S. legal community, parties take for granted 
that the Supreme Court may legitimately promulgate doctrine that applies the 
Constitution’s textual meaning to novel facts. But the explicitly regulatory 
objectives of anti-evasion doctrine take the Court out of this familiar terrain. 
From where do courts derive authority to regulate evasive governmental ac-
tion? How does anti-evasion doctrine relate to judicial decisions that simply 
apply constitutional meaning to new facts? Is anti-evasion doctrine the kind 
of “constitutional law” that, under Marbury v. Madison, cannot be revised 
through legislation?480 
Two positions on these questions find support within the scholarly lit-
erature.481 Under one view, doctrine that undertakes to regulate evasion of 
constitutional norms is part-and-parcel of constitutional law proper and 
cannot usefully be distinguished from doctrine that elaborates and applies 
constitutional meaning. “Methodological pragmatists” posit that the way in 
which courts understand constitutional rights is inevitably influenced by 
remedial considerations—including, as is relevant here, governmental ac-
tors’ ability to evade constitutional norms.482 The most forceful advocate of 
this position in the contemporary literature is Professor Daryl Levinson.483 
Based on extended analysis of three post-Brown institutional reform litiga-
tions, Levinson contends that “constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, 
and incorporate, remedial concerns.”484 Indeed, it generally is impossible to 
disentangle a constitutional “right” from the remedy that follows if the right 
is violated. In the justices’ internal deliberations and the public justifications 
for their decisions, “[c]onstitutional adjudication is functional not just at the 
level of remedies, but all the way up.”485 
Two features of Levinson’s account are especially relevant to judicial 
regulation of constitutional evasion. First, Levinson sees no point to divid-
ing judge-made constitutional law into doctrine that interprets the Constitu-
tion’s meaning and doctrine that remedies violations or otherwise “imple-
ments” constitutional meaning.486 Virtually “any constitutional right can be 
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described as overenforced, or prophylactic, relative to some hypothesized 
‘core’ principle.”487 Accordingly, efforts to identify a separate domain of 
implementing doctrine distinct from the Constitution’s “real” meaning 
(whether identified with original meaning, moral principle, or other phe-
nomena) are at best quixotic, and at worst a distraction from the forces that 
animate constitutional decision making in the real world.488 
Second, because concerns about remedies are, as it were, baked into 
the definition of constitutional rights, Congress does not necessarily have 
power to modify remedial doctrines, including those that regulate constitu-
tional evasion.489 Because there is no neat dividing line between decisions 
that interpret the Constitution’s meaning and those that implement constitu-
tional norms, no single part of judge-made “constitutional law” is categori-
cally subject to legislative revision. What matters when Congress attempts 
to revise judge-made rules of decision “is the constitutional judgment of the 
Court,” which ultimately must reconcile the preexisting body of doctrine 
with Congress’s enactments.490 That judgment is achieved by “a process of 
remedial equilibration” that “frustrates any attempt to distill the pure es-
sence of rights.”491 
The counterpoint to Levinson’s unified vision of constitutional adjudi-
cation is provided by “new doctrinalist” scholarship492 that recognizes a 
distinct body of judge-made constitutional law dedicated to implementing 
the Constitution. A pair of articles by Professors Henry Monaghan and Law-
rence Sager493 first suggested this category of doctrine, which is now the 
subject of an extensive literature.494 Its defining feature is its independence 
from constitutional meaning derived through traditional methods of textual 
and historical interpretation. As expressed by Monaghan, “a surprising 
amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best 
understood as something of a quite different order—a substructure of sub-
stantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and au-
thority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions.”495 Doc-
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trinalists call the development of implementing doctrine “constitutional 
construction,” as distinguished from “interpretation” of the Constitution’s 
semantic meaning.496 
Various labels have been proposed for implementing doctrine, which 
reflect differences in the way that scholars conceive of its legal status and 
place in the constitutional order.497 In more explicitly functional terms, all 
implementing doctrines are defined by their forward-looking, regulatory 
character. Implementing doctrine does not tell what the Constitution means 
but instead establishes legal rules that, if successful, ensure that it functions 
in the intended manner. 
For doctrinalists, the legitimacy of implementing doctrine rests on 
overlapping theories of authority. Some implementing doctrine, such as 
standards of proof, is unavoidable if Article III courts are to adjudicate cas-
es and controversies.498 Even if implementing doctrine is not strictly neces-
sary to the adjudication of individual cases and controversies, Article III 
may justify such doctrine because it improves courts’ ability to judge cases 
on the merits over the long run. Some observers see this justification at 
work in Supreme Court’s 1966 opinion in Miranda v. Arizona; confronted 
with a large number of “confessions,” the voluntariness of which could not 
be ascertained via case-by-case factfinding, the Court put in place a 
proxy—the Miranda warnings—that permits courts to reliably determine 
whether confessions were obtained in compliance with the Fifth Amend-
ment.499 Monaghan adds a further, institutional argument for the legitimacy 
of court-created implementing doctrine. The incorporation of the Bill of 
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Rights against the states created a powerful need for national law specifying 
the forms of governmental action that are consistent with the Constitu-
tion.500 Given Congress’s relative inactivity in the area of individual rights 
and the absence of positive legislation that precludes the development of 
federal common law, the “federal law of civil liberties” is plausibly under-
stood as a form of federal common law developed under the Supreme 
Court’s stewardship.501 
Although doctrinalists agree with Levinson about the centrality of 
remedies to constitutional decision-making, they reject the suggestion that 
constitutional law is an undifferentiated mass of legal, institutional, and re-
medial concerns. Having ascertained constitutional meaning to the extent 
possible, “[t]he work that remains to be done is distinctively lawyers’ work, 
involving not just the identification of constitutional meaning, but also the 
creative design of implementing strategies and the allocation of responsibil-
ity between courts and other institutions of government.”502 
In a further contrast to Levinson, doctrinalists tend to welcome the in-
volvement of Congress in the development of doctrine that implements the 
Constitution.503 The case for involving Congress invokes familiar institu-
tional competencies: its ability to investigate social facts and legal condi-
tions; its ability to draft specific legal controls; and its ability to make use of 
regulatory mechanisms, such as funding conditions, that are unavailable to 
courts.504 Though scholars differ over which constitutionally grounded deci-
sions Congress can modify, they agree that Congress can supplement or re-
place court-developed remedial schemes if legislation provides the level of 
regulation the Constitution requires.505 In institutional terms, doctrinalists 
see no reason why courts should be the sole creators of law that implements 
the Constitution even if, as Marbury instructs, the Supreme Court has the 
final word on what the Constitution means. 
The Crawford experience does not resolve the larger debate among 
methodological pragmatists and doctrinalists. However, it suggests that 
Crawford-type anti-evasion rules are best understood as a form of implement-
ing doctrine and that, with respect to this form of doctrine, there is a tractable 
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and theoretically useful distinction between doctrine that elaborates constitu-
tional meaning and doctrine that implements the Constitution.506 
Recall the causes of the Crawford regime’s failure. As Part III argues, 
Crawford’s “testimonial” rule is driven by concerns about governmental 
evasion of the confrontation right. To regulate activities that the Court per-
ceived as “core confrontation violations,”507 Crawford redefined “witnesses 
against [the accused]” as individuals who generate “testimonial” evi-
dence508—an example of what Levinson terms “remedial incorporation.”509 
In presenting this anti-evasion rule as something that was required by the 
Sixth Amendment’s text, Crawford delayed the development of workable 
doctrine. As Part III demonstrates, the Court’s decision to present the testi-
monial rule as constitutional meaning obscured the task for doctrine, pre-
vented the Court from identifying the evidentiary practices that should be 
regulated as evasion, and frustrated consideration of those questions in later 
cases. 
In contrast, it is reasonable to think that if the Court had followed the 
decision-tree approach outlined above, the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
post-Crawford doctrine would be much improved. The theoretical basis for 
applying the confrontation right would have been clear: evidence would 
either be testimony of a “witness” expressly covered by the Confrontation 
Clause or a substitute for witness testimony that involved evasion of the 
confrontation right. With a stable theoretical basis, implementing doctrine 
could reasonably be expected to be more coherent and stable. 
At least in this specific context, recognizing a distinct category of im-
plementing doctrine has a clear payoff. The Court’s decision to present its 
rule as unadorned constitutional meaning, by contrast, had significant nega-
tive consequences for the development of modern Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. 
C. What Crawford Should Have Said 
The preceding sections argue that the Crawford experience suggests a 
decision tree for courts asked to regulate seemingly evasive activities and 
explain that Crawford-type anti-evasion rules are best understood as a form of 
implementing doctrine rather than an interpretation of the Constitution’s 
meaning. Having done so, this section concludes with some doctrinal impli-
cations of the argument. Given the Article’s focus, it cannot address all of the 
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doctrinal issues that remain open following Crawford.510 Instead, it applies the 
decision-tree approach to the kind of evidence at issue in Crawford, Bryant, 
Davis v. Washington, and Giles v. California, and considers when the Con-
frontation Clause should regulate “post-crime” statements—those made to 
government officers in the aftermath of a crime. 
Recall the basic fact pattern common to these cases: following a crime, 
a person with information about it gives statements to an agent of the gov-
ernment, such as a 911 operator or police officer. The account is recorded,511 
memorialized in the officer’s notes,512 or memorialized in a written state-
ment that the declarant signs.513 The declarant fails to appear as a witness at 
trial, and the government moves to admit the post-crime statements as evi-
dence of the defendant’s guilt. The statements typically fall within an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, so the crucial question is whether the Confronta-
tion Clause bars the prosecution from introducing them as evidence.514 
The initial point to recognize is that, as a textual and historical matter, 
the Confrontation Clause does not apply to post-crime statements of its own 
force. An individual who gives a statement to a government officer in the 
aftermath of a crime is not a “witness against [the accused]” in the sense 
contemplated by those who enacted the Clause, because such an individual 
is not a witness who gives live testimony in a legal proceeding. Thus, if the 
Clause is not read as an all-purpose license for the development of constitu-
tional evidence law, the case for applying the Clause to post-crime state-
ments turns centrally on whether the statements’ use involves evasion of the 
core confrontation right. 
The next question is whether the use of post-crime statements creates a 
state of the world that is constitutionally impermissible. Following the sug-
gestion in Part IV section A,515 the question can usefully be approached by 
considering whether the practice creates a harm that the Confrontation 
Clause seeks to regulate. 
Although individuals who make post-crime statements are not witnesses 
against the accused in the sense originally contemplated by the Confrontation 
Clause, they are similar to the witnesses who appeared in Marian proceedings 
and offered testimony to initiate a criminal prosecution. This functional simi-
larity suggests that the use of unconfronted post-crime statements creates a 
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constitutionally cognizable harm. But in view of the diversity of modern 
criminal evidence, it is helpful to define that harm with more precision. 
As this Article suggests, and Mattox v. United States, Roberts, and 
Crawford all recognize, the basic harm that the Confrontation Clause regu-
lates is bifurcating the processes of generating evidence and adjudicating 
guilt.516 Taking testimony before trial and introducing it as evidence of the 
accused’s guilt necessarily deprives the accused of an opportunity to be 
confronted with adverse witnesses at trial. Indeed, it was not until 1895 that 
the Supreme Court held that an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses at 
a prior trial satisfied the Confrontation Clause.517 If the accused is not pre-
sent when testimony is initially taken, bifurcated proceedings furthermore 
deprive the accused of any opportunity to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him. 
To the extent that the Clause regulates criminal evidence beyond this 
core scenario, it is not concerned with the use of any evidence that might be 
considered inferior to viva voce testimony of trial witnesses. As Part II 
demonstrates, reading the Confrontation Clause to regulate what constitutes 
evidence is at odds with its historical meaning. Moreover, the regulatory 
model of the Clause suffers from a basic incompatibility with the remedy 
that the Supreme Court has always applied for violations of the Clause: ex-
clusion of unconfronted statements. Confrontation may be an effective way 
of ensuring that judges and juries have the opportunity to observe the char-
acteristics of a witness in person.518 As a way of ensuring the fairness and 
completeness of evidence that is not generated by an ordinary witness, 
however, confrontation’s value varies—and is sometimes nonexistent.519 
Rather than operating to define evidence or the conditions in which 
non-witness evidence can be used, the Clause in historical context was spe-
cifically concerned with evidence (1) generated through state-created pro-
cedures, (2) serving as a substitute for trial testimony, and (3) that was infe-
rior to trial testimony in its fairness and completeness. It was this form of 
evidence that Raleigh was complaining about when he demanded that Cob-
ham be “brought hither” so that Raleigh could confront him about the in-
consistencies in his account of the Bye conspiracy.520 And it was this form 
of evidence that framing-era lawyers would have been familiar with from 
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the Marian statutes, which directed justices of the peace to take testimony in 
pre-trial proceedings where the accused might not have the opportunity to 
be confronted with adverse witnesses.521 The Clause thus reflects a concern 
with why the prosecution is relying on evidence inferior to live trial testi-
mony, not simply the relative advantages and disadvantages of trial testimo-
ny and other forms of proof. It is where the state institutionalizes the pro-
duction of substitutes for trial testimony that the objectives of the Confron-
tation Clause are most salient. 
The use of post-crime statements generally involves such evidence. In 
the modern world, the response to crime continues to be organized by the 
state and structured to generate evidence for use in criminal prosecutions. 
911 calls are recorded.522 Police officers are trained to elicit information 
pertinent to criminal prosecutions523 and are rewarded based on their ability 
to do so. Other government employees are required to uncover and report 
crimes.524 
It is true, as Justice Thomas observes, that government agents often 
have multiple reasons for eliciting information about crime, and, particular-
ly, may elicit information “to meet an ongoing emergency.”525 But even 
then, they still participate in a state-created system designed to create evi-
dence, which produces evidence inferior to trial testimony in its fairness and 
completeness if one accepts the premises of the Confrontation Clause. It 
follows that doctrine can legitimately regulate the use of post-crime state-
ments as evasion of the Confrontation Clause, even if the prosecution does 
not specifically intend to strip the accused of the right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him or her.526 
There are important limits to this principle, however. When the ac-
cused has the practical ability to secure the testimony of a declarant whose 
post-crime statements are introduced at trial, as by subpoenaing the declar-
ant to testify, he or she is empowered to do what Raleigh demanded of the 
Crown: “bring forth” the witness against him or her.527 Nor does the use of 
post-crime statements create a constitutionally relevant harm when, in tort 
terms, an intervening cause prevents the declarant from appearing as a trial 
witness. Think for example of a declarant who is killed by the defendant,528 
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one who dies of natural causes before trial,529 or one who moves to a loca-
tion beyond the subpoena power of U.S. courts.530 Here, the prosecution 
proposes to use a form of evidence that is inferior to trial testimony in its 
fairness and completeness and was generated through state-created process-
es. However, use of the inferior evidence is necessitated by the intervening 
cause, and not by the processes the state has established for generating evi-
dence and adjudicating guilt. As such, the scenarios do not involve the use 
of inferior evidence as a substitute for trial testimony in the sense contem-
plated by the Confrontation Clause. 
The next question is whether doctrine regulating the use of post-crime 
statements should be implemented under the Confrontation Clause or a 
broader source of constitutional authority. As two scholars observed in an 
important pre-Crawford article, the use of post-crime statements is intuitively 
evasive.531 When the prosecution introduces recorded 911 calls as evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt, callers are effectively permitted “to dial in their testi-
mony, without having to appear at trial, take an oath, or subject themselves to 
cross-examination.”532 Prosecutors know this. For example, in Bryant, the 
prosecution noted in its opening remarks that the deceased victim’s post-
crime statement was “[t]he most important piece of evidence you’ll hear dur-
ing this trial.”533 The victim was “speaking to you from the grave and telling 
you what happened . . . and telling you who’s responsible.”534 
The only possible remedy for the use of such statements is the exclu-
sion of statements where the accused was not afforded the right to confront 
an adverse witness; the statements cannot be made more complete or fair 
through other interventions. Regulation should therefore be implemented 
under the Confrontation Clause, as it is under current doctrine. 
In concrete terms, this approach to pre-trial statements would generate 
marginal but potentially important changes to the law. Participants in police 
interrogations would generally be subject to the confrontation requirement 
(as Crawford held),535 as would 911 callers (contra Davis)536 and individuals 
who make statements to police officers responding to reports of crime (as 
the Court held in Hammon v. Indiana, decided jointly with Davis).537 The 
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baseline scope of the confrontation requirement would thus be broader than 
it is under Crawford and subsequent cases. 
Where the doctrine suggested by this Article’s decision tree differs 
from current law is in the exceptions to the baseline confrontation require-
ment. The use of post-crime statements would not trigger a right of confron-
tation where the defendant had the practical ability to secure trial testimony 
of the declarant, or the declarant was genuinely unable to testify as a trial 
witness because of developments for which the state was not responsible. 
Doctrine configured along these lines has a stronger claim to legitima-
cy than existing doctrine. The confrontation requirement would continue to 
apply to the category of evidence contemplated by the framers: testimony of 
ordinary witnesses given in any stage of a criminal case. Where the re-
quirement applied to evidence that is not the testimony of any ordinary wit-
ness, the evidence would implicate the particular harm the Clause sought to 
address. 
There is also reason to think that doctrine structured along the lines 
suggested here would be more administrable than current doctrine. With a 
cogent theoretical basis for determining the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause, it would be comparatively easy to determine whether specific evi-
dence triggered a right to confrontation. The questions that determine the 
applicability of the Confrontation Clause—Is evidence generated by an or-
dinary witness? Does it create the harm the Clause sought to regulate?—are 
susceptible to established forms of argument and proof. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following Crawford 
is one of the most notable and theoretically important developments in 
modern constitutional law. Crawford promised easily administrable, de-
fendant-protecting, constitutionally grounded regulation of the evidence 
used in criminal prosecutions. Contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine 
has failed to deliver on these promises. 
This Article demonstrates that the failure of the Crawford regime orig-
inates in the Supreme Court’s unsuccessful effort to regulate evidentiary 
practices that evade the Confrontation Clause. Crawford regulates evidence 
that is not generated by “witnesses against the accused” through a constitu-
tional anti-evasion rule. The need for such a rule is obvious once one recog-
nizes the transformation in the understanding of evidence between the fram-
ing and the modern day. Crawford, however, did not acknowledge that the 
task for doctrine was to regulate evasion, consider the different forms of 
evasion a legal system can regulate, or recognize the tradeoffs presented by 
the regulatory strategies they entail. Moreover, Crawford reasoned that 
1980 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1899 
“evasive” activities could be identified through textual interpretation—a 
mode of interpretation incapable of performing that task. These missteps led 
to a breakdown in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that continues to this 
day. 
This account of contemporary Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
suggests a pathway out of the Crawford “shambles” and has broader impli-
cations for constitutional law. Because of social and legal change, govern-
mental actors frequently are able to bring about outcomes the Constitution 
sought to prevent without violating its prescriptive, conduct-regulating 
commands. The analytic framework suggested by the Crawford experience 
promises to improve the effectiveness and coherence of doctrine that re-
sponds to this recurring problem of constitutional law. 
